882 F.3d 443
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Greene was convicted in 1996 of second-degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy; redacted confessions of codefendants were admitted at trial.
- On direct appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court Greene raised a Bruton/Confrontation Clause claim; the Superior Court rejected it and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed leave as improvidently granted.
- Greene did not file a certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court; his conviction became final in July 1999.
- Greene filed a PCRA petition; appointed PCRA counsel filed a Finley “no merit” letter and the PCRA court dismissed the petition. The state courts held Greene’s ineffective-assistance claims were waived for lack of specificity.
- Greene later filed federal habeas proceedings; his ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel (IAAC) claim was procedurally defaulted for failure to present it in state court. He sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief based on Martinez and later appealed the district court’s denial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is warranted to revive a procedurally defaulted IAAC claim | Greene: Martinez exception applies; PCRA counsel’s failure to raise IAAC is "cause" excusing default, so Rule 60(b)(6) extraordinary circumstances exist | State: Motion is successive habeas or, even if not, Martinez does not extend to appellate-counsel claims; no cause exists | Denied: Martinez does not extend to appellate-counsel claims after Davila; PCRA counsel’s ineffectiveness cannot excuse default of IAAC; Rule 60(b)(6) relief not warranted |
| Whether Martinez creates ‘‘cause’’ for defaulted claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness | Greene: Martinez’s rationale (protect one counseled opportunity) applies to appellate-ineffective-assistance claims | State: Martinez is limited to trial counsel claims in initial-review collateral proceedings; it doesn’t apply to appellate counsel claims | Held: Martinez limited to trial-counsel context; Davila forecloses extension to appellate counsel, so Martinez does not provide cause |
| Whether the Rule 60(b) motion was an impermissible second or successive habeas petition | Greene: Motion characterized as Rule 60(b) invoking Martinez, not a successive petition | State: Motion seeks to present a new habeas claim without §2244(b)(3)(A) authorization | Held: Court treated the question but concluded Davila dispositive; regardless, Rule 60(b)(6) relief denied on merits under existing law |
| Whether exceptional equitable factors support relief under Cox factors | Greene: Equitable factors and Martinez together justify reopening | State: Equitable factors do not favor relief; procedural default remains | Held: No need to remand on Cox factors because Davila forecloses the legal basis; district court’s denial affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058 (2017) (Supreme Court declined to extend Martinez to ineffective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims)
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow exception permitting postconviction counsel ineffectiveness to supply "cause" for default of trial-ineffectiveness claims)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (generally holds attorney errors in postconviction proceedings cannot establish "cause")
- Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185 (1998) (Confrontation Clause limits on admission of certain redacted codefendant confessions)
- Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (holding regarding admission of co-defendant confessions implicating defendant)
- Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2014) (framework of equitable factors applied to Rule 60(b)(6) motions invoking Martinez)
- Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (earlier appellate opinion addressing Greene’s Confrontation Clause claim)