Eric Blackmon v. Gregory Jones
132 F.4th 522
7th Cir.2025Background
- Eric Blackmon was convicted of murder in 2004, primarily based on eyewitness identifications following photo arrays and lineups organized by Chicago police officers.
- Blackmon's conviction stood after multiple state challenges, but a federal district court later found his counsel’s failure to investigate alibi witnesses rendered the conviction unreliable, ordering a release or retrial.
- The State released Blackmon without retrial; he then sued three investigating officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing that unduly suggestive identification procedures violated his rights.
- The specific procedures Blackmon challenged involved displaying him as the only suspect with braids, a detail described by witnesses, in both photo arrays and lineups.
- The officers moved for qualified immunity, arguing that they could not be held liable for any constitutional violation stemming from these identification procedures.
- The district court denied qualified immunity, finding the law on suggestive identifications to be well established; defendants appealed that ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are police liable for damages under § 1983 for using an unduly suggestive lineup or photo array? | The use of suggestive identification methods violated Blackmon’s due process right to a fair trial, entitling him to damages. | Only exclusion at trial—not damages—remedies any right; police are not liable since prosecutors/judges decide admissibility. | No § 1983 liability; proper remedy is exclusion, not damages. |
| Does the constitutional right against unduly suggestive identification bar only the use of evidence at trial, or does it extend to conduct by police pretrial? | Rights are violated by both the suggestive procedures themselves and their later use. | No constitutional violation until evidence is used at trial; police conduct alone is not actionable. | Police conduct alone is not actionable; violation occurs, if at all, at trial. |
| Can officers be denied qualified immunity for organizing suggestive identifications under clearly established law circa 2002? | Law was clearly established since Simmons that use of suggestive identifications was unconstitutional. | It was not clearly established that officers could personally be liable; no precedential case holds as much. | Qualified immunity applies; law not clearly established for personal officer liability. |
| Do “unusual circumstances” (e.g., police lying or manufacturing evidence) create damages liability for police? | Such circumstances would justify § 1983 liability, and these claims exist in the complaint. | Not disputed on appeal, as immunity claim did not address allegations of lying or manufactured evidence. | Not addressed on appeal; immunity only for use of suggestive identification per se. |
Key Cases Cited
- Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (Constitution bars trial use of identifications obtained via unduly suggestive procedures)
- Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (Standards for assessing reliability of eyewitness identifications)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings required before custodial interrogation)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (Absolute immunity for prosecutors’ conduct at trial)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (Prosecutorial immunity from civil suit for acts in initiating prosecution)
- Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356 (Absolute immunity for testimony in judicial proceedings)