Eric Alston v. City of Madison
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6145
| 7th Cir. | 2017Background
- Madison Police created a focused-deterrence Special Investigations Unit to monitor the most serious repeat violent offenders and to encourage enforcement (including urging probation revocation) while offering resources to reduce reoffending; detectives selected candidates from DOC and police lists and a committee chose ten initial members.
- Eric Alston, one of the first ten selected, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, police leadership, and three detectives, claiming selection was race-based (Equal Protection), that program inclusion deprived him of liberty without due process (stigma-plus), and that a probation officer’s apprehension request violated the Fourth Amendment.
- Alston relied on population/arrest/program racial statistics (Madison 4.5% Black, arrests 37.6% Black, program 86% Black) and statements by officials referencing racial disparity in incarceration; he also argued gang affiliation served as a racial proxy in selection.
- Procedural events: Alston missed a November 16 probation home visit (dispute whether he timely notified his officer), an apprehension request was issued, he missed a rescheduled appointment, was later involved in a domestic-battery investigation, and his probation was revoked by a hearing examiner who had met with detectives and had been encouraged to revoke program members’ probation.
- The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed, finding Alston failed to show discriminatory effect or purpose, failed to prove a stigma-plus due-process deprivation, and that the apprehension request was supported by reasonable suspicion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal Protection: selection because of race | Alston: program disproportionately Black and selection (including use of gang as proxy) shows discriminatory effect and purpose | Defs: selection based on crime histories, risk, and resource drain; statistics alone insufficient; no proof of discriminatory intent | Court: Summary judgment for defendants—Alston failed to show discriminatory effect or purposeful discrimination |
| Equal Protection: use of racial proxy (gang affiliation) | Alston: gang affiliation functioned as proxy for race showing disparate treatment | Defs: argument not raised below; evidence insufficient to prove intent | Court: Argument forfeited on appeal and, in any event, insufficient to show intent |
| Due Process (stigma-plus) | Alston: program branded him a repeat violent offender, increased surveillance/penalties and biased hearing examiner altered legal status | Defs: surveillance and enforcement were within preexisting authority; notification meeting and supervision terms fall within probation restrictions; bias claim would imply invalidity of revocation | Court: Stigma shown but no alteration of recognized legal status/rights — no stigma-plus; bias claim barred by Heck doctrine |
| Fourth Amendment (apprehension request) | Alston: he rescheduled appointment before missing it; request lacked reasonable suspicion | Defs: officer reasonably believed Alston missed visit; apprehension requests need only reasonable suspicion | Court: No genuine dispute—Reynolds had reasonable suspicion (Alston admitted not at home for scheduled visit); no Fourth Amendment violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir.) (elements for equal-protection claim: discriminatory effect and purpose)
- McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (disparate impact rarely suffices to prove discriminatory purpose)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (factors for proving discriminatory intent beyond disparate impact)
- Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (disparate impact alone insufficient to establish discriminatory purpose)
- Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (extreme statistical disparities can demonstrate intent)
- Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (egregious disparate treatment established discriminatory purpose)
- Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (defamation to public not alone a due-process liberty deprivation)
- Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (probationers’ liberty interests are diminished and subject to conditions)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (§ 1983 claim that would imply invalidity of conviction or sentence is barred)
- Tapley v. Chambers, 840 F.3d 370 (7th Cir.) (summary-judgment standard and review)