Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Freeman, 126 F. Supp. 3d 560

Background

Freeman performed targeted criminal and credit background checks and disqualified applicants only for certain convictions and specific credit indicators; applicants could explain adverse findings.
The EEOC sued Freeman for disparate-impact Title VII violations based on its background-check practices after a charge by Katrina Vaughn.
The EEOC’s statistical proof relied principally on expert Dr. Kevin R. Murphy, whose initial and supplemental reports contained numerous methodological errors, data exclusions, and other defects identified by Freeman.
Freeman moved to exclude the EEOC’s experts and for summary judgment; the district court granted both motions and the Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Freeman sought attorneys’ and expert fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k); the district court awarded Freeman $938,771.50 after reducing fees for work performed before Freeman’s motion to exclude and making several other adjustments.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether prevailing defendant may recover fees under Title VII	EEOC: Its suit was not frivolous; possible proof of disparate impact existed; appeal was reasonable	Freeman: EEOC’s case depended on unreliable expert statistics; continuing after flaws were exposed was unreasonable	Award of fees to Freeman permitted because EEOC continued litigating after its case became groundless
What standard governs fee awards to prevailing defendants under Title VII	EEOC: fee award inappropriate absent bad faith	Freeman: Christiansburg standard allows fees where claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or continued after clear defeat	Court applied Christiansburg rule; bad faith not required — only that claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or persisted after it became plainly so
Whether general population statistics could salvage EEOC’s prima facie case	EEOC: external population data can be probative even if not a perfect match	Freeman: general stats did not match Freeman’s narrowly tailored practices and relevant employer data was available	Court held general population stats were insufficient where employer-specific data existed and expert failed to construct representative sample
Temporal scope of fee recovery and reasonableness of requested fees	EEOC: fees excessive, duplicative, and should be denied for work with amici, unrecovered motions, or pre-exclusion work	Freeman: fees are reasonable and necessary to demonstrate EEOC’s claim was groundless and to litigate appeal and fee petition	Court awarded fees only from date of Freeman’s motion to exclude (Dec. 18, 2012), reduced specific rates and items, and granted a total of $938,771.50

Key Cases Cited

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978) (prevailing defendant may recover fees if plaintiff’s claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or continued after it clearly became so)
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (use of congruent population statistics can show disparate impact)
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (refined employer-specific statistical comparisons required to prove disparate impact)
EEOC v. Propak Logistics, Inc., 746 F.3d 145 (4th Cir. 2014) (district court discretion in fee determinations and assessing reasonableness of claim)
EEOC v. Freeman, 778 F.3d 463 (4th Cir. 2015) (affirming exclusion of EEOC experts and district court judgment for defendant)
Robinson v. Equifax Info. Svcs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235 (4th Cir. 2009) (lodestar method and factors for determining reasonable fees)