Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Ford Motor Co.
782 F.3d 753
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Jane Harris, a Ford resale buyer with irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), sought to telecommute "up to four days per week" as an ADA accommodation; Ford denied the request as it viewed regular, predictable on-site attendance as essential to the highly interactive resale-buyer role.
- Harris had a documented history of poor performance and chronic, unpredictable absenteeism; prior accommodations (three telecommuting trials and workplace attendance plans) failed to produce regular, consistent attendance or satisfactory performance.
- Ford’s telecommuting practice allowed limited, typically one set day per week telework for resale buyers, with advance scheduling and agreement to come in when needed; Ford concluded Harris’s proposed unpredictable schedule would remove an essential job function.
- Harris filed an EEOC charge and the EEOC sued Ford under the ADA for failure to accommodate and for retaliation; the district court granted summary judgment to Ford; a divided Sixth Circuit panel reversed, and the court granted en banc review.
- The en banc Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Ford: (1) Harris was not a "qualified individual" because regular, predictable on-site attendance is an essential function she could not meet even with accommodations; (2) the EEOC failed to show pretext or but-for causation for a retaliation claim.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether regular, predictable on-site attendance is an essential function of the resale-buyer position | Harris (EEOC) argued her duties were largely performed by phone/email and other buyers teleworked, creating a factual dispute that on-site presence is nonessential | Ford argued the job is highly interactive, requires face-to-face meetings/troubleshooting, and its policies/practices and job descriptions show on-site attendance is essential | Held: On-site attendance is an essential function; no genuine factual dispute—summary judgment for Ford |
| Whether Harris's requested accommodation (unpredictable telework up to 4 days/week) was reasonable | Harris argued the request was within Ford’s telecommuting policy and would accommodate her disability | Ford argued the request removed an essential job function and was unlike the limited, scheduled telework others had | Held: Accommodation unreasonable as it eliminated an essential function and prior limited trials failed |
| Whether Ford failed to engage in the ADA interactive process in bad faith | EEOC argued Ford did not adequately clarify or explore limited alternatives and shut down discussions | Ford argued it met, discussed alternatives (closer workspace, reassignment), and asked Harris to propose alternatives but she did not | Held: Court did not need to decide interactive-process bad faith because Harris was unqualified; Ford acted in good faith in any event |
| Whether Ford retaliated by terminating Harris after her EEOC charge (but-for causation and pretext) | EEOC argued temporal proximity, post-charge negative review, PEP design, and supervisor conduct created triable issues of retaliation | Ford asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons—longstanding poor performance, absenteeism, failed PEPs—and that EEOC offered no evidence showing pretext or but-for causation | Held: No genuine dispute of material fact; Ford’s performance-based reasons were legitimate and nonpretextual; retaliation claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- EEOC v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 253 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 2001) (regular attendance generally essential to most jobs)
- Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994) (employee not performing on-site cannot perform job functions)
- Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233 (9th Cir. 2012) (employee testimony alone insufficient to create fact issue on essential functions)
- Mason v. Avaya Commc'ns, Inc., 357 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2004) (employer judgment and job requirements considered in essential-function analysis)
- Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857 (6th Cir. 1997) (defining qualification and essential-function standards under the ADA)
- Brickers v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 145 F.3d 846 (6th Cir. 1998) (removing an essential function is per se unreasonable)
- Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411 (2011) ("cat's paw" theory; liability where biased nondecisionmaker causes adverse action)
- Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (retaliation requires but-for causation)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (pretext and evidentiary standards at summary judgment)