827 F. Supp. 2d 688
E.D. La.2011Background
- Harrison was hired by Resources for Human Development, Inc. d/b/a Family House of Louisiana in 1999 as a Prevention/Intervention Specialist, overseeing a daycare program; she weighed over 400 pounds at hire.
- She was terminated in 2007 when her weight exceeded 500 pounds, with diabetes, hypertension, and congestive heart failure noted as related conditions.
- Harrison filed an EEOC charge on October 17, 2007 alleging she was terminated due to being regarded as disabled because of obesity.
- Harrison died on November 1, 2009; the death certificate listed morbid obesity as the primary cause and other conditions as contributing factors.
- The EEOC filed suit on September 30, 2010 on Harrison’s behalf, alleging disability under the ADA and that she was terminated because of obesity; defendant moved for summary judgment in August and November 2011, which the court denied in full.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is severe obesity a disability under the ADA? | Harrison’s severe obesity is an impairment under the ADA; no physiological cause proof is required when obesity is outside normal range. | Obesity is not an impairment unless a physiological disorder is shown; the EEOC guidelines do not treat obesity as per se a disability. | Severe obesity qualifies as a disability under the ADA; no underlying physiological basis is required. |
| Was Harrison a qualified individual with a disability? | Harrison could perform the essential job functions with reasonable accommodation; she was actually disabled due to obesity-related conditions. | Employer disputed essential functions and argued obesity impaired performance; no accommodation proved workable. | A genuine dispute exists regarding whether Harrison could perform the job with reasonable accommodation. |
| Did Harrison suffer an adverse employment decision due to disability? | Termination was because she was regarded as disabled due to obesity. | Termination due to obesity severely impairing job performance, not disability discrimination. | Material fact exists on whether termination was because of disability or performance impairment. |
| Have administrative remedies been exhausted? | EEOC charge and intake form should reasonably encompass claims of actual disability alongside regarded-as claims. | Scope limited to the EEOC investigation of the charge; actual disability claim not exhausted. | Administrative remedies exhausted; EEOC claim properly within the scope of the investigation. |
| Is judicial estoppel applicable to bar the ADA claim? | EEOC may pursue claims independently of Harrison’s SSDI statements; EEOC is not bound by her SSA filings. | Inconsistent statements between SSA and EEOC could estop Harrison’s disability claims. | Judicial estoppel does not apply to barred EEOC action; the court should allow clarification of inconsistent statements. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cook v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281 (2nd Cir. 1997) (morbid obesity as impairment when related to physiological disorder; weight alone not impairment)
- E.E.O.C. v. Watkins, 463 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2006) (disability requirement for impairment may hinge on physiological cause; reg. disabled theory)
- Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (S. Ct. 1999) (SSDI and ADA claims may coexist; need explanation for inconsistencies)
- Giles v. General Electric Co., 245 F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2001) (Cleveland framework applied to ADA claims; discretion to explain inconsistencies)
- Reed v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 218 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2000) (judicial estoppel under inconsistent statements in SSA and ADA context)
- McClaren v. Morrison Management Specialists, Inc., 420 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 2005) (application of Cleveland to age-discrimination context; examples of valid estoppel explanations)
- In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 1999) (criteria for applying judicial estoppel)
- In re Superior Crewboats, Inc., 374 F.3d 330 (5th Cir. 2004) (three requirements for judicial estoppel applying in Fifth Circuit)