Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Banner Health, 402 F. App'x 289

EEOC sues Banner Health for age discrimination under the ADEA on behalf of Fernando and Maria Rosales, who were terminated at age 61 after allegedly missing work the week after Christmas.
District court granted Banner summary judgment, concluding EEOC failed to show a prima facie case or pretext for age discrimination.
Banner cross-appeals denial of its motion for attorneys’ fees and costs, arguing bad faith or vexatious conduct by EEOC.
Court reviews de novo the grant of summary judgment and reviews fee rulings for abuse of discretion; jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is proper.
The court analyzes whether EEOC produced evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext after establishing a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
Rosaleses allegedly failed to obtain written approval for time off, contradicting Banner’s policy, which the court views as a terminable offense.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether EEOC established pretext for age discrimination	EEOC claims Banner’s reason is pretext for age bias.	Banner’s written-time-off policy and denial of written approval show legitimate non-discriminatory reasons.	No triable issue on pretext; dismissal affirmed.
Whether EEOC established a prima facie ADEA case and triable facts remain	EEOC contends prima facie case plus evidence of discrimination.	Rosaleses’ missing work and failure to follow policy support termination for legitimate reasons.	Prima facie established but no evidence of discriminatory motive; summary judgment affirmed.
Whether Banner is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs under § 1927 or inherent authority	EEOC’s conduct justifies sanctions and fees.	No bad faith or vexatious conduct by EEOC; fees not warranted.	District court did not abuse discretion; fees denied.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (establishes the three-step burden-shifting framework for circumstantial evidence)
Diaz v. Eagle Produce Ltd. P’ship, 521 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2008) (applies McDonnell Douglas framework in the Ninth Circuit)
Wallis v. J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 1994) (pretext requires more than credibility attacks on the employer’s reason)
Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 F.3d 1271 (9th Cir. 2000) (pretext may be shown by false reason or discriminatory true reason)
Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1997) (pretext analysis requires more than denial of credibility)
Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2006) (credibility denial alone does not prove pretext)
Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (bad-faith requirement for fee sanctions recognized)
In re Keegan Mgmt. Co. Sec. Litig., 78 F.3d 431 (9th Cir. 1996) (subjective bad faith essential to § 1927 or inherent sanctions)
Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1997) (inherent authority to sanction bad-faith litigation requires bad faith)
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240 (U.S. 1975) (agency standards for sanctions; bad-faith conduct standards)
Lindahl v. Air France, 930 F.2d 1434 (9th Cir. 1991) (standard of reviewing summary judgment)