Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.
135 S. Ct. 2028
| SCOTUS | 2015Background
- Samantha Elauf, a Muslim applicant, wore a headscarf to an Abercrombie & Fitch job interview; interviewer Cooke rated her hireable but was concerned the headscarf violated the store's "Look Policy."
- Cooke asked supervisors whether the headscarf was a prohibited "cap;" district manager Johnson, after being consulted, told Cooke not to hire Elauf because headwear (religious or not) violated the policy.
- EEOC sued Abercrombie on Elauf's behalf under Title VII, alleging refusal to hire because of religious practice; District Court granted EEOC summary judgment on liability and awarded damages; Tenth Circuit reversed and granted Abercrombie summary judgment.
- Central legal question: whether Title VII disparate-treatment liability for refusing to hire to avoid accommodating a religious practice requires that the applicant first inform (or that the employer have actual knowledge of) the need for accommodation.
- Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit, holding that Title VII forbids making an applicant’s religious practice a motivating factor in an employment decision even if the employer lacks actual knowledge; an applicant need only show the religious practice was a motivating factor in the adverse decision.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title VII disparate-treatment liability for refusal to hire to avoid accommodation requires applicant to inform employer (actual-knowledge requirement) | EEOC/Elauf: No knowledge prerequisite; it is enough that the employer’s motive was to avoid accommodating a religious practice | Abercrombie: Employer must have actual knowledge (or be informed) of the need for accommodation before liability attaches | Court: No actual-knowledge requirement; employer liability turns on whether religion/religious practice was a motivating factor in the decision |
| Whether failure-to-accommodate claims are distinct from disparate-treatment or must proceed as disparate-impact | EEOC: Refusal to hire because of a religious practice is disparate treatment (religion includes observance/practice) | Abercrombie: Such claims should be disparate-impact or otherwise require different treatment | Court: Disparate-treatment covers refusal to hire because of religious observance/practice; neutral policies must give way when motive is avoiding accommodation unless undue hardship shown |
| Whether Title VII requires proof the employer treated religious practices less favorably than similar secular practices | EEOC: Not required; religion is afforded protected status and favored treatment via accommodation duty | Abercrombie: Neutral policy applied equally should not be actionable as disparate treatment | Court: Neutral policy is not a defense if motive was avoiding religious accommodation; Title VII requires accommodation unless undue hardship |
| Burden allocation on accommodation/undue hardship | EEOC: Employer bears undue-hardship defense once plaintiff shows adverse action because of religious practice (per concurrence) | Abercrombie: Plaintiff must show failure to accommodate as part of proof | Court (majority): Plaintiff must show religion was a motivating factor; the undue-hardship accommodation defense remains available to employer (allocation nuances discussed in concurrences) |
Key Cases Cited
- Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (addressed refusal to accommodate Sabbath observance and undue hardship defense)
- Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (discusses intentional discrimination/disparate-treatment concept)
- Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (distinguishes disparate-impact from disparate-treatment)
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (formulation of disparate-impact theory)
- University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (but-for causation and discrimination causation standards)
- Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (discriminatory purpose requires more than awareness of consequences)
- Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (discusses incorporation of reasonable accommodation duty into Title VII definition of religion)