Enoma Igbinovia v. James Dzurenda
20-16259
| 9th Cir. | Nov 18, 2021Background
- Pro se appellant Enoma Igbinovia, a former Nevada state prisoner, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging failures to apply statutory good-time and work/education credits to his minimum and maximum sentences.
- The district court dismissed the complaint on initial screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
- The district court dismissed equal protection, retaliation, and Ex Post Facto claims without prejudice for failure to plead plausible facts.
- The district court dismissed due process and Eighth Amendment claims based on parole-eligibility deprivation with prejudice, finding Nevada law confers no protected liberty interest in parole.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed those dismissals but vacated the dismissal of Igbinovia’s due process and Eighth Amendment claims challenging statutory deductions to his maximum sentences because Igbinovia is no longer incarcerated and habeas relief may be unavailable; the case was remanded for further consideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Equal protection ("class of one") | Igbinovia alleges unequal treatment in credit application | Insufficient factual allegations to show purposeful unequal treatment | Dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead plausibly |
| Retaliation (First Amendment) | Credits denial was retaliatory for protected conduct | Pleading lacks facts showing adverse action and causal link | Dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead plausibly |
| Ex Post Facto | Retroactive credit scheme increased punishment | Law not shown to be retroactive or punitive as pleaded | Dismissed without prejudice for failure to plead plausibly |
| Due process & Eighth re: parole eligibility | Denial of credits infringed liberty and constituted cruel punishment | Nevada law grants no protected liberty interest in parole | Dismissed with prejudice (no liberty interest) |
| Due process & Eighth re: statutory deductions to maximum sentence / habeas bar | Seeks §1983 relief for improper statutory deductions affecting sentence length | District court concluded relief barred by Wilkinson v. Dotson (habeas) | Dismissal vacated and remanded because plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and habeas may be unavailable; §1983 possible per Nonnette |
Key Cases Cited
- Byrd v. Maricopa County Bd. of Supervisors, 845 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2017) (standard of review for screening dismissals)
- Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338 (9th Cir. 2010) (pro se pleadings must still state plausible claims)
- Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (elements of equal protection "class of one" claim)
- Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2005) (retaliation standards in prison context)
- Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (ex post facto analysis requires retrospective law that increases punishment)
- Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (no liberty interest where decision left to state discretion)
- Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658 (9th Cir. 2010) (Nevada law does not create a parole liberty interest)
- Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) (habeas v. §1983 boundary when success would affect duration of confinement)
- Nonnette v. Small, 316 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (§1983 viable where habeas relief is unavailable)
- Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2009) (appellate waiver of issues not raised in opening brief)