Enbridge Energy, LLC v. Kuerth
2016 IL App (4th) 150519
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2016Background
- IEPC (now Illinois Extension Pipeline Co.) obtained Illinois Commerce Commission certificates authorizing construction of the Southern Access Extension (SAX) pipeline and, in April 2014, eminent-domain authority to acquire permanent (60-ft) and temporary (60-ft) easements across many tracts after negotiations with landowners.
- IEPC sent final offers (May 2014) to the Kuerth landowners; after no response, IEPC filed separate condemnation complaints (July 2014) to determine just compensation.
- Landowners filed traverse motions seeking dismissal on multiple grounds (lack of authority, public use/necessity, bad-faith negotiations, expired certificate, private-pipeline claim, excessive taking), and requested discovery prior to the traverse hearings.
- At the May 2015 condemnation trial, the court excluded several of landowners’ witnesses and expert valuation testimony (McCann) after voir dire; IEPC’s appraiser (Brorsen) testified and provided valuation methodology and figures.
- After the court barred landowners’ valuation evidence and witness testimony, it granted IEPC directed verdicts and awarded nominal compensation; landowners appealed.
- The appellate court affirmed evidentiary rulings regarding admissibility of speculative/stigma-based testimony and barring particular witnesses, but vacated the denial of the traverse motions and remanded for a limited, expedited traverse proceeding to allow landowners an opportunity to rebut statutory presumptions and challenge good-faith negotiation findings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (IEPC) | Defendant's Argument (Landowners) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether landowners were entitled to discovery before traverse hearing | No; Commission orders and appellate decisions supply the prima facie record; broad discovery is unnecessary | Yes; traverse resembles a trial and requires discovery to prepare challenges to authority, negotiations, and project scope | Denied discovery at initial hearing, but appellate court vacated that denial and remanded for limited, court‑supervised discovery focused on rebutting statutory presumptions and refuting good‑faith finding |
| 2. Scope and effect of statutory rebuttable presumptions (public use/necessity) | Commission certificates and eminent‑domain grant create rebuttable presumptions for IEPC that should be afforded deference | Presumptions may be rebutted by defendants; trial court must allow evidence to challenge public use/necessity and good faith | Court held presumptions applied and that landowners are entitled to attempt to rebut them; remand for limited traverse proceeding to test rebuttal evidence |
| 3. Admissibility of landowners’ valuation and stigma/fear testimony | Bar such testimony as speculative, unsupported, and inconsistent with earlier deposition admissions | Testimony about stigma, hydrostatic testing, spills, and personal valuation knowledge is relevant to remainder damages and value | Trial court did not abuse discretion in excluding speculative/stigma testimony or witnesses with irrelevant experience; admissibility largely depends on proper foundation |
| 4. Exclusion of plaintiffs’ (landowners’) expert McCann and directed verdict for IEPC | McCann relied on improper elements (temporary construction interference) per Trunkline and was thus inadmissible; with no opposing competent evidence, directed verdict appropriate | Exclusion was erroneous; McCann was qualified and jury should decide damages | Exclusion of McCann upheld (improper elements of damage). With only IEPC expert valuation admitted and no competent rebuttal evidence presented, directed verdict for IEPC was proper at that stage; but traverse denial vacated and remanded for further limited proceedings |
Key Cases Cited
- Trunkline Gas Co. v. O’Bryan, 21 Ill. 2d 95 (supreme court) (temporary construction interference is not a proper element of condemnation damages)
- Franciscan Sisters Health Care Corp. v. Dean, 95 Ill. 2d 452 (supreme court) (procedure and effect of rebuttable presumptions; bursting‑bubble theory)
- In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439 (supreme court) (standard—abuse of discretion—for evidentiary rulings)
- United Cities Gas Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 163 Ill. 2d 1 (supreme court) (deference to administrative agency findings; Commission as fact‑finder)
- People ex rel. Madigan v. Illinois Commerce Comm’n, 2015 IL 116005 (supreme court) (deference to Commission decisions and rate/utility expertise)
- Lake County Forest Preserve Dist. v. First Nat’l Bank of Waukegan, 154 Ill. App. 3d 45 (app. ct.) (framework for traverse hearings and burdens)
- Board of Education of Wapella CUSD No. 5 v. Regional Bd. of School Trustees, 245 Ill. App. 3d 776 (app. ct.) (procedural remand to conduct limited hearing while appellate court retains jurisdiction)