Emmett v. Armstrong, 973 F.3d 1127

Background

At an Elks Club in Greybull, WY, Officer Armstrong (in uniform, in marked vehicles with lights flashing) called to Morgan Emmett, who walked and then ran away; Armstrong chased and tackled him.
After being tackled Emmett lay on his back, appeared relaxed and not actively resisting; about 10 seconds after the tackle Armstrong warned “You’re going to get TASE’d!” and delivered a single five‑second Taser cycle to Emmett’s abdomen.
Emmett sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) unreasonable seizure/arrest without probable cause for interfering with a peace officer; (2) excessive force for the Taser deployment; and (3) a Monell failure‑to‑train/supervise claim against the police chief in his official capacity.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on qualified immunity grounds; the body‑cam video was in the record and summary‑judgment review requires viewing facts in the light most favorable to Emmett unless the video blatantly contradicts him.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed as to the seizure claim (probable cause existed given officer’s uniform, marked cars, lights, prior arrest nearby, and crowd compliance) but reversed as to excessive force (Taser use without adequate warning after Emmett ceased resisting) and reversed the grant as to the Monell claim to the extent it related to the use of force; the case was remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because Armstrong did not verbally identify himself as a police officer, so Emmett lacked knowledge and thus probable cause to arrest for interfering with a peace officer	Emmett: absence of verbal ID meant he did not know Armstrong was an officer, so he lacked the requisite knowledge to be guilty of interfering with a peace officer	Armstrong: totality of circumstances (uniform, marked cars, lights, prior handcuffing/arrest of another, crowd compliance) made it objectively reasonable to believe Emmett knew he was an officer	Affirmed for defendant: objectively reasonable officer could conclude Emmett knew Armstrong was a police officer, so arrest was supported by probable cause; qualified immunity applies
Whether Armstrong’s deployment of a Taser constituted excessive force (no adequate warning; after Emmett ceased active resistance)	Emmett: he was subdued, relaxed, and not actively resisting when tased and received insufficient warning, so force was unreasonable	Armstrong: chase and initial resistance justified force; video ambiguous about level of resistance	Reversed for defendant: viewing evidence for Emmett, Taser use was objectively unreasonable given misdemeanor at issue, lack of threat, cessation of resistance, and inadequate warning
Whether the right was clearly established in Oct. 2013 (qualified immunity prong) regarding tasing a misdemeanant without adequate warning after resistance ceased	Emmett: Tenth Circuit precedent (Casey, Cavanaugh) placed officers on notice that such Taser use was unconstitutional	Armstrong: challenged availability/applicability of precedent	Reversed for defendant: Casey and Cavanaugh made it clearly established that tasing a nonviolent misdemeanant who is not resisting—or after resistance has ceased—without adequate warning is unconstitutional
Whether municipal (Monell) liability survives given the court’s findings	Emmett: Monell claim depends on underlying constitutional violation (use of force)	Brenner/City: district court found no constitutional violation and so granted summary judgment	Reversed in part: because excessive‑force violation was found plausible, the district court’s grant of summary judgment on Monell failure‑to‑train/supervise as to use of force is reversed and remanded

Key Cases Cited

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (video evidence may be treated as dispositive only where it blatantly contradicts a party’s version of events)
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (probable cause standard for arrests)
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (objective‑reasonableness inquiry for arrests focuses on totality of circumstances, not arrestee’s subjective knowledge)
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (Fourth Amendment objective‑reasonableness test for excessive force; Graham factors)
Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir.) (using a Taser on a nonviolent misdemeanant without warning is excessive force)
Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, 625 F.3d 661 (10th Cir.) (reiterating that an officer may not tase a nonviolent misdemeanant who is not resisting without first giving a warning)
Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability under § 1983 depends on an underlying constitutional violation)