Emmett Magee v. Coca-Cola Refreshments USA Inc
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14978
| 5th Cir. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff Emmett Magee, who is legally blind, sued Coca-Cola under Title III of the ADA after being unable to use Coca‑Cola glass‑front, self‑service vending machines at a hospital and bus station because the machines relied on a visual interface.
- Magee alleged the machines’ alphanumeric keypad and glass‑front product codes render blind users unable to identify or select products and proposed remedies (audio interface, tactile keypad, smartphone app, or hotline).
- Magee sued only Coca‑Cola (owner/operator of the vending machines), not the hospitals or transit authorities where machines were located.
- Coca‑Cola moved to dismiss, arguing the vending machines are not "places of public accommodation" under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7), so Title III does not apply to Coca‑Cola in this context.
- The district court granted dismissal; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding vending machines are not "sales establishments" or "places of public accommodation" under the statute and regulations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Coca‑Cola’s vending machines constitute a "place of public accommodation" ("sales establishment") under 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(E) | Magee: vending machines are "sales establishments" because they sell goods to the public and thus fall within the statute’s enumerated categories | Coca‑Cola: the statutory examples describe physical stores/places; vending machines are personal property/equipment, not "establishments" | Held: Vending machines are not "sales establishments"; the term "establishment" implies a distinct physical place of business, so Title III does not make Coca‑Cola liable solely as owner/operator of the machines |
| Whether DOJ regulations or legislative history expand the definition to include vending machines or non‑store sales devices | Magee: DOJ regulations/agency guidance support treating vending machines as "facilities" or covered equipment | Coca‑Cola: DOJ examples and legislative history indicate "sales establishments" are actual stores; regulations presuppose a facility/place | Held: Court need not resolve "facility" question; legislative history and DOJ guidance treat examples as physical stores, supporting rejection of Magee’s broader reading |
Key Cases Cited
- Parker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir.) (interpreting §12181(7) terms as physical, public places)
- Ford v. Schering‑Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir.) (refusing expansive readings of "public accommodation" beyond physical places)
- Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir.) (describing enumerated §12181(7) terms as actual physical places where goods/services are obtained)
- Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Auto. Wholesaler’s Ass’n of New England, Inc., 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.) (contrasting view that can interpret public accommodation beyond physical places)
- A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (U.S.) (defining "establishment" as a distinct physical place of business)
- Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (U.S.) (agency guidance under ADA entitled to deference)