Emmanuel Beverly v. Matt Macauley, 20-1452

Background

Victim T.B., age seven, made inculpatory statements at a district preliminary examination that were never given under oath or after a formal competency inquiry; a transcript was created.
At trial the court found T.B. unavailable and the prosecution read the preliminary-exam transcript to the jury; prosecutor, judge, and defense repeatedly characterized that transcript as sworn/competent.
Defense counsel did not object at the preliminary exam to the lack of oath or competency and at trial objected only on hearsay/motive-for-cross-examination grounds (not explicitly on Confrontation Clause grounds).
The jury heard corroborating testimony from the victim’s sister and mother and a physician who described rectal tearing consistent with insertion, and convicted Emmanuel Beverly of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Michigan courts upheld the conviction; the federal district court conditionally granted habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Sixth Circuit majority reversed: it held the state-court adjudication was not an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland, and that Beverly’s Confrontation Clause claim was procedurally defaulted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Beverly)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
1) Ineffective assistance for failing to object to admission of unsworn preliminary-exam testimony	Counsel’s omission was deficient and prejudicial because the unsworn transcript was the only direct inculpatory evidence and was repeatedly mischaracterized as sworn, undermining the trial’s fairness.	Any objection at trial would have been futile because Beverly failed to preserve the unsworn-testimony objection at the preliminary exam; state court reasonably found no Strickland prejudice given corroborating evidence.	Reversed the district court: under AEDPA the Michigan Court of Appeals’ application of Strickland was not objectively unreasonable; no federal habeas relief on this ground.
2) Confrontation Clause challenge to admission of preliminary-exam statements	Admission violated Crawford because the preliminary hearing was not a constitutionally adequate prior opportunity for cross-examination (no oath, limited questioning, and jury could not observe witness demeanor).	Beverly forfeited the Confrontation claim by failing to make a contemporaneous constitutional objection; state court reviewed only for plain error and reasonably found no reversible error.	Claim is procedurally defaulted: Michigan’s contemporaneous-objection/plain-error practice is adequate and independent, and Beverly did not show cause and prejudice to excuse default.
3) Whether misstatements that the transcript was sworn affected prejudice analysis	Misrepresentations by prosecutor, judge, and defense amplified prejudice and deprived jury of its exclusive role to assess credibility.	State court reasonably weighed the record and corroborating evidence; any misstatements did not render the state decision an unreasonable application of federal law.	Majority: not enough under AEDPA to conclude state court unreasonably applied law; dissent disagreed, finding material prejudice.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (testimonial statements require prior opportunity for cross-examination)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (distinguishing testimonial statements)
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (prior testimony at preliminary hearing may satisfy Confrontation Clause when adequate safeguards exist)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA review: state-court decision stands unless objectively unreasonable)
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (deference to state court on application of general rules)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (standard for harmless-error review on habeas)
Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368 (6th Cir. 2005) (counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct can satisfy Strickland prejudice)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA unreasonable-application framework)