901 F. Supp. 2d 1138
D.N.D.2012Background
- Plaintiff Emineth challenges Section 16.1-10-06 of the North Dakota Century Code as applied on Election Day (nov. 6, 2012).
- ND statute prohibits asking, soliciting, or inducing a voter on Election Day to vote or refrain from voting, with limited exceptions for billboards/adhesive signs; it criminalizes broad electioneering speech.
- Emineth seeks to engage in protected political speech (yard signs, distributing flyers) on Election Day, which he cannot do under the statute.
- Plaintiff argues the statute enforces a prior restraint on First Amendment rights and is not narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.
- Court analyzes whether the statute constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint, violates free speech rights on Election Day, and is not narrowly tailored to a compelling interest.
- Court grants preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Section 16.1-10-06 pending merits resolution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the ND electioneering ban violate First Amendment rights? | Emineth argues the law suppresses protected speech on Election Day. | Hovland contends the ban is justifiable regulation of conduct near polling places. | Yes; ban is unconstitutional as a broad prior restraint on speech. |
| Is there irreparable harm if injunction is not issued? | Emineth asserts irreparable harm to political speech rights on a crucial election day. | ND lacks irreparable harm because statute serves public interest in fair elections. | Yes; irreparable harm evident given time-sensitive election speech. |
| Do the Dataphase factors favor issuance of a preliminary injunction? | Enforcement would chill core First Amendment speech. | State interest in orderly elections supports enforcement. | Weights favor injunction due to likelihood of success and public interest in free speech. |
| Is the statute narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest? | Law is not narrowly tailored; bans all election-related speech. | Justifies prohibition as preventing confusion and last-minute tactics around polls. | No; statute fails strict scrutiny and is overly broad. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (invalidates broad election-day suppression of speech; strong First Amendment protection of discussion of elections)
- Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (recognizes compelling interest in regulating conduct around polls; narrow tailoring required)
- Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963) (prior restraints bear heavy presumption against validity)
- Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (limits on government regulation of speech in public fora; time/place/manner considerations)
- Bd. of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (overbreadth in regulation of speech in public settings; narrow tailoring required)