36 F.4th 755
7th Cir.2022Background
- Dr. Emily Lewis, a 60‑year‑old Black woman, was hired in 2017 as Director of Instructional Design at Indiana Wesleyan University and supervised five instructional designers.
- In mid‑2018 Lewis complained that subordinates (all white) would not take direction from her; her supervisor Lorne Oke made racially charged remarks and informed her on August 6, 2018 that he intended to remove her supervisory responsibilities.
- After Lewis reported discrimination to university officials, Oke created a new director‑level role for her with the same pay/benefits but no supervisory duties; she worked intermittently from home thereafter.
- The Center for Learning and Innovation later merged under Erin Crisp, who—apparently unaware of Lewis’s complaint—decided in Feb. 2019 to eliminate Lewis’s position and offered a lower‑level research assistant job, which Lewis rejected and then left.
- Lewis sued under § 1981, Title VII, and the ADEA alleging retaliatory demotion, retaliatory termination, and discriminatory termination (race and age). The district court granted summary judgment for the University on retaliation, deemed the age claim waived, but did not explain its ruling on the race claim.
- The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment as to retaliation, held the age claim waived for inadequate briefing, vacated the summary judgment ruling as to Lewis’s race‑discrimination termination claim, and remanded for further consideration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Race‑based discriminatory termination | Lewis: her termination was caused by race; Oke’s racial animus infected the decision to eliminate her role | Univ.: Crisp legitimately eliminated the role for nonracial reasons; district court granted SJ (without explanation) | Vacated and remanded — district court failed to explain ruling on race claim; appellate court declines to decide in first instance |
| Age discrimination termination (ADEA) | Lewis: termination was discriminatory because of age | Univ.: Lewis waived the ADEA claim by failing to develop the but‑for causation argument below | Affirmed waiver — Lewis failed to brief the ADEA’s but‑for requirement; claim waived |
| Retaliatory demotion (Aug. 2018) | Lewis: removal of supervisory duties was retaliation for her complaint | Univ.: Oke decided to remove supervision before Lewis complained; new role retained pay/benefits so not adverse | Affirmed for Univ. — protected complaint post‑dated Oke’s decision; no causal link |
| Retaliatory termination (Feb. 2019) | Lewis: termination was retaliation; alternatively invokes cat’s‑paw (Oke’s animus imputed to Crisp) | Univ.: Crisp was unaware of Lewis’s complaint when she decided to eliminate the position; no retaliation | Affirmed for Univ. — Crisp lacked knowledge of protected activity; Lewis waived cat’s‑paw theory by not developing it below |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) (courts must assess all evidence as a whole at summary judgment)
- Tyburski v. City of Chicago, 964 F.3d 590 (7th Cir. 2020) (ADEA requires but‑for causation; summary judgment standards)
- Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass'n of Afr. Am.‑Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020) (distinguishing motivating‑factor vs but‑for standards under different statutes)
- Abrego v. Wilkie, 907 F.3d 1004 (7th Cir. 2018) (elements of Title VII discrimination claims)
- McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 942 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2019) (§ 1981 and Title VII analyses are largely aligned)
- Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs., Ltd., 937 F.3d 919 (7th Cir. 2019) (issues waived if underdeveloped or not specifically argued)
- Place v. Abbott Labs., 215 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2000) (transfer with same title/pay/benefits typically not an adverse action)
- Petts v. Rockledge Furniture LLC, 534 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2008) (mini‑RIF: consider whether duties were absorbed outside protected class)
- McDaniel v. Progress Rail Loco., Inc., 940 F.3d 360 (7th Cir. 2019) (cat’s‑paw theory and imputing bias)
