Ellis v. Oliver
714 F. App'x 847
10th Cir.2017Background
- Inmate Damon Ellis injured his right ring finger in October 2013; medical staff diagnosed a ruptured tendon requiring urgent surgery, and outside specialists confirmed need for prompt treatment.
- By January 2014, a hand specialist said primary tendon repair was no longer possible and offered either no treatment, tendon removal, or a two-stage tendon graft; Ellis faced imminent transfer to a halfway house.
- Prison medical staff (acting, Ellis alleges, under directions of supervisory defendants) told Ellis he could have the two-stage surgery and remain in prison to heal, or be transferred without the procedure; Ellis declined to delay transfer and refused to sign a release.
- Ellis sued under Bivens and the Federal Tort Claims Act against the United States, the Bureau of Prisons, Warden John Oliver (official and individual capacity), prison physician David Allred, and unnamed supervisory defendants, alleging Eighth Amendment denial of adequate medical care.
- The magistrate judge dismissed official-capacity constitutional claims and some individual-capacity claims but denied Warden Oliver’s qualified immunity defense as to individual-capacity Eighth Amendment claims; Oliver appealed.
- The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo and held Ellis’s complaint failed to plead Oliver’s personal involvement with sufficient specificity to state a plausible Bivens claim, reversing and instructing dismissal of claims against Oliver.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ellis pled a plausible Eighth Amendment Bivens claim against Warden Oliver personally | Oliver, as supervisory warden, must have known of Ellis’s urgent need and thus is individually liable; supervisory direction caused the deprivation | Complaint lacks specific allegations of Oliver’s personal actions or policies; undifferentiated references to “Supervisory Defendants” are insufficient | Held for Oliver: complaint fails to allege Oliver’s personal involvement or requisite state of mind; qualified immunity bars the claim |
| Whether pleading met the Iqbal requirement of individualized factual allegations | Alleged staff acted “pursuant to the direction and decision of various Supervisory Defendants,” implying Oliver’s role | Term “various Supervisory Defendants” is ambiguous and does not link Oliver specifically to conduct | Held for Oliver: allegations are conclusory and do not clear Iqbal’s plausibility threshold |
| Whether court must reach clearly-established-law prong of qualified immunity | N/A — Ellis argues constitutional violation occurred, implying right was clearly established | Oliver contends qualified immunity applies unless Ellis pleads personal involvement | Court: Because no plausible constitutional violation by Oliver was pled, court did not decide clearly-established prong |
| Whether limited pretrial discovery into John/Jane Doe identities was necessary before ruling | Ellis suggests supervisory responsibility could be established after discovery | Defendants moved to dismiss before discovery; magistrate ruled on the pleadings | Court noted limited discovery can sometimes be appropriate but decline to reach that issue here; dismissal instructed against Oliver |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard requires plausible, individualized factual allegations)
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Bivens creates a cause of action for damages against federal officers for constitutional violations)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (qualified immunity shields officials unless conduct violated clearly established rights)
- Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2013) (Bivens requires pleading each defendant’s individual actions; vicarious liability not permitted)
- Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2011) (review of qualified immunity denials and pleading requirements)