Elizabeth A. Lousteau and Brett Clanton v. Jaime L. Noriega and Sonia A. Noriega, 01-15-00254-CV

Appellants (Lousteau & Clanton) purchased 314 Goldenrod at a sheriff's sale after a default judgment in an earlier suit; Noriega plaintiffs alleged the property was their homestead and sued (bill of review, declaratory relief, and later a wrongful-execution claim).
Plaintiffs (Noriega) had not lived at 314 Goldenrod since 2006 (moved to Chicago); the house was rented to tenants intermittently thereafter.
At a two-day jury trial the court submitted two homestead questions: (1) whether 314 Goldenrod was the Noriegas’ homestead when purchased in 1994, and (2) whether it was their homestead on March 4, 2014 (the execution date). Jury answered Yes to Q1 and No to Q2.
The trial court disregarded the jury’s answer to Q2 as immaterial, concluded the property was the Noriegas’ homestead on March 4, 2014, entered an interlocutory judgment setting aside the sale, ordered return of the deed and future rents to Plaintiffs, and left open Plaintiffs’ wrongful-execution claim.
Appellants challenge (on appeal) the court’s actions: disregarding a material jury finding, treating abandonment as waived/not tried by consent, submitting an improper Q1, issuing an interlocutory judgment after a merits jury trial, severing claims post-trial, and awarding damages/specific performance without a jury finding.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held (trial-court action)
1. May the court disregard a jury finding on a fact issue (homestead on execution date)?	Noriega: court may determine homestead continuation as matter of law once initial status established.	Lousteau/Clanton: homestead status on execution date is a factual issue for the jury; court lacked basis to disregard Q2.	Trial court disregarded jury Q2 and ruled property homestead on March 4, 2014.
2. Was abandonment tried by consent (despite failure to plead/waive)?	Noriega: abandonment defense was waived by defendants; not tried by consent.	Lousteau/Clanton: abandonment was directly at issue—pled or anticipated in pleadings, developed in opening and testimony, and submitted in jury charge—so tried by consent.	Trial court concluded abandonment was waived / not tried by consent.
3. Was Q2 (homestead on March 4, 2014) material?	Noriega: Q1 established homestead historically, so Q2 immaterial.	Lousteau/Clanton: Q2 is dispositive because the execution date determines exemption; jury evidence focused on abandonment/intent to return.	Trial court declared Q2 immaterial and disregarded it.
4. Was submission of Q1 (homestead in 1994) proper and controlling?	Noriega: historical homestead status supports relief.	Lousteau/Clanton: Q1 was not a controlling issue for the declaratory relief concerning the 2014 execution; submitting Q1 caused improper judgment.	Trial court submitted Q1 and relied on it in issuing judgment.

Brown v. Bank of Galveston, Nat'l Ass'n, 963 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1998) (homestead status is a jury question when evidence conflicts)
Ingram v. Deere, 288 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009) (issue not pleaded may be treated as tried by consent when both parties litigate it without objection)
Sage St. Assocs. v. Northdale Constr. Co., 863 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1993) (unpleaded issue may be tried by consent where parties present conflicting evidence and the jury resolves it)
Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1994) (a jury finding is material if it goes to the heart of the case; court cannot disregard a material jury answer)
Phillips v. Phillips, 820 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. 1991) (plaintiff may plead facts that anticipate and thus negate the need for defendant to plead certain affirmative defenses)