Elijah Manuel v. City of Joliet
903 F.3d 667
| 7th Cir. | 2018Background
- Elijah Manuel was arrested on March 18, 2011 for possession of pills; a judge ordered him held pending trial that day.
- Prosecutor dismissed the charge on May 4, 2011 after concluding the pills were legal; Manuel was released May 5, 2011.
- Manuel sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 22, 2013 alleging detention without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
- Illinois law supplies a two-year statute of limitations for the § 1983 claim; federal law governs when the claim accrued.
- Defendants argued accrual occurred March 18 (when judge ordered custody); Manuel argued accrual occurred May 4 (dismissal/vindication).
- The Seventh Circuit held the claim accrued on May 5 (the date of release), making the suit timely and reversed the district court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does a Fourth Amendment claim for detention without probable cause accrue? | Accrues on dismissal/vindication of charges (May 4). | Accrues when judicial process began/when bound over (March 18), per Wallace. | Accrues when detention ends (date of release, May 5). |
| Does Wallace v. Kato govern accrual for wrongful pretrial detention? | Manuel argued Wallace’s rule does not control detention challenges that continue after process begins. | Defendants relied on Wallace that accrual occurs upon initiation of legal process. | Wallace’s single-line rule does not apply to ongoing detention claims after Manuel; accrual waits until the wrongful custody ends. |
| Is analogy to malicious prosecution appropriate for accrual? | Manuel urged a malicious-prosecution analogue where claim accrues on vindication. | Defendants previously conceded that if the claim were "Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution" accrual would be on vindication. | Supreme Court in Manuel rejects malicious-prosecution framing; the claim is a straight Fourth Amendment detention claim, so accrual follows detention dates. |
| Does Preiser/Heck bar a §1983 suit while judicially-authorized custody continues? | Manuel argued he could not sue while detained. | Defendants argued accrual on judicial binding date despite detention. | Preiser/Heck/Edwards require waiting until release (or availability to sue) when custody is judicially authorized; claim cannot accrue while detention continues. |
Key Cases Cited
- Manuel v. Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (2017) (held detention without probable cause is actionable under the Fourth Amendment and rejected the malicious-prosecution analogy)
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2007) (held Fourth Amendment claims generally accrue when legal process begins; court relied on but limited its scope)
- Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (state statute of limitations governs §1983 claims)
- National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002) (continuing violations doctrine: statute runs when wrong ends for ongoing violations)
- United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979) (accrual principles for federal claims)
- Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250 (1980) (accrual and continuing wrong distinction)
- Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas is the proper vehicle to challenge ongoing state custody)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (limits on §1983 claims that would imply the invalidity of a conviction; claim not cognizable until conviction set aside)
- Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (Heck principle extended to certain administrative custody deprivations)
- Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (Fourth Amendment claims analyzed under objective probable-cause standards)
