Elias v. DeLapp, 4:17-cv-00220

Plaintiff Marsden Voltaire Elias, a pro se prisoner, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint challenging his conviction and alleging he was not fully advised of plea consequences and is factually innocent.
Elias alleged Washington County District Judge Curtis L. DeLapp maliciously stalled his attempts at redress/appeal.
Plaintiff sought vacatur of his conviction, exoneration, and compensation for losses and suffering.
The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2), applying Rule 12(b)(6)/Twombly-Iqbal pleading standards and construing pro se filings liberally.
The court found DeLapp’s actions were judicial and subject to absolute judicial immunity and dismissed damage claims with prejudice.
The court held that requests to vacate the conviction must be pursued via habeas corpus, not § 1983, and dismissed those claims without prejudice; the dismissal is flagged under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) as a “prior occasion.”

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Judicial immunity for damages	Elias contends DeLapp improperly stalled appeals and acted maliciously in prosecution	DeLapp’s judicial acts are protected by absolute judicial immunity	Claims for money damages against Judge DeLapp dismissed with prejudice (absolute judicial immunity)
Appropriate remedy to challenge conviction	Elias seeks vacatur/exoneration via § 1983 asserting plea misinformation and factual innocence	Relief from conviction requires habeas, not § 1983; § 1983 inappropriate for challenging fact/duration of confinement	Request to vacate conviction dismissed without prejudice to pursue habeas corpus
Pleading sufficiency (screening standard)	Elias alleges facts about plea and innocence but provides limited supporting factual detail	Court applies Twombly/Iqbal and pro se liberal construction but requires plausible claims	Complaint fails to state a claim under § 1915A/b and is dismissed
Effect under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)	N/A — plaintiff sought IFP and filed initial partial fee	Dismissal qualifies as a “prior occasion” for strikes under § 1915(g)	Dismissal is to be flagged as a prior occasion under § 1915(g)

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (establishes plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (applies Twombly standard to all civil actions)
Andrews v. Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (absolute immunity bars damages for judicial/prosecutorial discretionary acts)
Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027 (10th Cir. 2006) (discusses prosecutorial/judicial immunity)
Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1994) (judicial acts receive absolute immunity)
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973) (habeas is exclusive remedy for prisoners challenging fact/duration of confinement)
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (limits § 1983 when success would imply invalidity of conviction)
Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2007) (applies § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) screening standard consistent with Rule 12(b)(6))
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (pro se complaints must be liberally construed)
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (liberal construction of pro se pleadings)
Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991) (pro se plaintiff still must allege sufficient facts)
Bryson v. City of Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990) (courts need not accept conclusory allegations)
McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809 (10th Cir. 1997) (distinguishes habeas from civil rights actions regarding remedies)