*4 Before GOR SU C H , and HO LM ES , Circuit Judges, and KR IEGER , District Judge. [**]
GORSUCH , Circuit Judge.
This сase involves three appeals and an array of appellate motions filed by Eddie L. Andrews arising from two federal lawsuits he brought seeking to compel federal judges to enjoin state court proceedings and obtain damages from them. A prior suit filed by M r. Andrews regarding the same subject matter resulted in an additional two appeals before this court. As with that first lawsuit, we now conclude that M r. Andrews’s second and third lawsuits are without merit and were properly dismissed by the district court. M r. Andrews’s complaints currently before us suffer from several fatal defects; among other things, they seek to assert claims against defendants entitled to absolute judicial immunity, fail to meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b) of the Fеderal Rules of Civil Procedure, and seek to enforce criminal statutes through a civil action. Because of the vexatious nature of M r. Andrews’s filings, the district *5 court imposed restrictions on M r. Andrews’s ability to pursue additional pro se filings in the W estern District of O klahoma. W e modify these restrictions, limiting them in scope to filings related to the subject matter of M r. Andrew s’s three related federal law suits, but we also extend them to preclude M r. Andrews from filing additional appeals in these or future related cases.
I
Although it is difficult to discern from the record, these appeals appear to have their origin in a 2001 decision by the Oklahoma D epartment of Human Services (“D HS”) to investigate complaints regarding various children in M r. Andrews’s care, at least one of whom appears to have been his daughter. DHS ultimately decided that the children should be placed in protective custody and then foster care, and that M r. Andrews should be denied custody and visitation rights to his daughter (and potentially the other children as well). It appears that M r. Andrews sought to regain custody through some sort of state сourt proceeding but grew frustrated and eventually sought recourse in federal court.
M r. A ndrews’s first federal case in the W estern District of Oklahoma, CIV-05-110, named various family members and three D HS agents as defendants; alleged a criminal conspiracy and violation of his procedural due process rights; and sought to enjoin undefined state court proceedings which, as best the district court could discern, appear to have involved a non-party to the lawsuit. Federal district court Judge Joe Heaton dismissed M r. Andrews’s claims, holding that most of the allegations fell outside the relevant statute of limitations and that a federal court had neither the authority to enjoin the proceedings of an independent sovеreign judicial system under the circumstances nor the authority to enjoin parties M r. Andrews had not named as defendants. M r. Andrews’s case resulted in two appeals to this court (filed on the same date), which were resolved together and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of his case.
M r. Andrews then filed his second federal lawsuit in the W estern District of Oklahoma, CIV-06-510, naming some 21 defеndants, including all of the federal district and appellate judges who had issued orders adverse to him, members of their staffs, and “John and Jane Does 1 through 199.” This lawsuit alleged, among other things, that the named defendants had entered into a criminal conspiracy to deprive M r. Andrews of his rights and defraud the United States in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corruрt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, et seq .
The claims against the federal judges and court employee defendants were dismissed sua sponte by Judge David L. Russell on M ay 17, 2006, because, the court held, these defendants were entitled to absolute judicial immunity for the alleged conduct in the complaint. Regarding the claims against the other defendants, Judge Russell held that the claims for violations of criminal statutes were not enforceable in a private civil action, the (generously read) civil RICO claims failed to comply with the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), and there were no allegations regarding any acts by the John and Jane Doe defendants. Judge Russell instructed M r. Andrews that if he wished to proceed with his law suit he should file an amended comрlaint within 20 days. M r. Andrews did not do so.
Instead, on M ay 30, 2006, M r. Andrews filed a motion to vacate Judge Russell’s order, which was denied on June 12, 2006. Undeterred, four days later M r. Andrews appealed Judge Russell’s ruling and filed a third federal law suit in the W estern District of Oklahoma, CIV-06-652. This third suit listed more than 80 defendants, including all of the then-sitting judges of the Tenth Circuit Court *8 of Appeals, all of the judges and magistrates in the W estern Distriсt of Oklahoma, a great many members of judicial staff, together with several private attorneys. [3]
Similar to his first two complaints, M r. Andrews’s third complaint alleged a vague yet vast criminal conspiracy. Given that every local judge w as named as a defendant, the case was assigned to Judge W illiam F. Downes, a federal judge from the D istrict of W yoming. Judge D ownes dismissed all of M r. Andrew s’s remaining claims because, the court held, M r. Andrews w as (again) impermissibly attempting to enforce criminal statutes through a private civil action. In [4] addition, Judge Downes established procedures for M r. Andrews to obtain *9 permission from the court before initiating any additional pro se lawsuits in the Western D istrict of Oklahoma. Finally, Judge Downes cautioned M r. Andrews about bringing another round of frivolous appeals to this court. M r. Andrews, however, promptly appealed.
All told, M r. Andrews has brought a total of five appeals in three federal lawsuits, three of which relate to his second and third lawsuits at issue here. Although it is often difficult to discern from his pleadings, M r. Andrews appears, at the very least, to contest before us Judge Russell’s dismissal of his second complaint; Judge D ownes’s order dismissing the third cоmplaint; and our orders of August 7, 2006, and August 18, 2006, abating M r. Andrews’s appeals of Judge Russell’s and Judge Downes’s dismissal orders while his motion to reconsider Judge Downes’s dismissal order w as pending in the district court. In addition to his appeals on the merits of these rulings, M r. A ndrews has also lodged two motions seeking to institute “a tribunal of special masters who are not now, nor have they ever beеn federal circuit judges or members of any bar” to hear his *10 cases. Beyond even this, M r. Andrews has submitted to us two sets of objections to our orders abating his appeals w hile the district court resolved his motion to reconsider; three motions for default judgment; a motion to strike a defense motion; and two motions to strike the various Appellees’s Opening Briefs because defense counsel of record, who include an Assistant United States Attorney, three Oklahoma Assistant Attorney Generals, and an Assistant General Counsel of DHS (the latter four attorneys are also named defendants in this matter), are allegedly improper “interlopers” in this matter without authority to represent the defendants.
II
W e read
pro se
complaints more liberally than those composed by lawyers
and dismiss them only when it appears “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Haines
v. Kerner
,
First, dismissal of the claims against the judicial defendants was proper
because it is well established that “[a]bsolute immunity bars suits for money
damages for acts made in the exercise of prosecutorial or judicial discretion.”
Guttman v. Khalsa
,
Second, even reading M r. Andrews’s second federal сomplaint as
generously as possible, dismissal of M r. Andrews’s second complaint was proper
because his vague and conclusory allegations of fraud failed to come anywhere
near satisfying the specificity requirements of Federal Rule Civil Procedure 9(b).
See Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co.
,
Third, M r. Andrews’s second complaint fails to include any аllegations regarding any acts by the unnamed John and Jane Doe defendants, and, therefore, dismissal of these defendants was proper.
Finally, dismissal of M r. Andrew s’s claims in his second and third
complaints alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 371, 1001, 1341, and 1503,
and 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(1), (2), (7), and (8), was proper because these are
criminal statutes that do not provide for a private right of action and arе thus not
enforceable through a civil action.
See United States v. Claflin
,
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s dismissals of M r. Andrew s’s lawsuits. [7]
III
Federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the activities of abusive
litigants by imposing carefully tailored restrictions in appropriate circumstances.
See Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n.
,
As part of his order dismissing M r. Andrews’s consolidated lawsuit, Judge
Dow nes enjoined M r. Andrews from filing any further lawsuits
pro se
in the
W estern District of Oklahoma w ithout first obtaining permissiоn of the Chief
Judge; the order, by its terms, does not affect M r. Andrews’s right to pursue
actions of any kind with the benefit of counsel. Still, although it is beyond cavil
that M r. Andrews has a history of vexatious
pro se
filings and the district court
provided a mechanism by which M r. Andrews may receive approval for future
pro
se
filings, we are inclined to think the district court’s order might be more
narrowly tailored, at least in the first instаnce. M r. Andrews’s abusive
pro se
*14
filing history is limited to pleadings filed in relation to state, and then federal,
court proceedings regarding the care and custody of his child(ren), and against
state and federal government officials and private attorneys related to these
matters. This history does not (at least as yet) suggest that M r. Andrews is likely
to abuse the legal process in сonnection with other persons and subject matters
and thus does not support restricting M r. Andrews’s access to the courts in
all
future
pro se
proceedings pertaining to
any
subject matter and
any
defendant.
See, e.g.
,
Sieverding
,
In addition to the district court’s filing rеstrictions we modify and approve, we believe that parallel filing restrictions in this court are warranted. M r. [9]
Andrews has abused the appellate process in a manner similar to his abuse of the
district court’s offices – filing five frivolous appeals in three separate cases, all
involving essentially the same claims, along w ith a raft of equally meritlеss
motions and objections.
See supra
at 9-10. Accordingly, subject to Rule 35 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Tenth Circuit Rule 35.1, we will not
accept any further
pro se
filings from M r. Andrews related to W estern District of
Oklahoma case Nos. CIV -05-110, CIV-06-510, or CIV-06-652; the Clerk of this
court shall return any such filings, unfiled, to M r. Andrews. Additionally, this
court will not accept any further
pro se
appeals or original proceedings filed by
M r. Andrews related to the subject matter of these cases. M r. Andrews shall have
*16
ten days from the date of this order to file written objections, limited to 15 pages,
to these proposed sanctions.
See Werner v. Utah
,
* * *
The judgment of the United States District Court for the W estern District of Oklahoma is affirmed, with the exception of that portion of the order placing filing restrictions on M r. Andrew s; those restrictions are modified to cover pro se filings in or relаted to the subject matter of W estern District of O klahoma case Nos. CIV-05-110, CIV-06-510, or CIV-06-652. M r. Andrews is further enjoined from additional pro se filings in this court in connection with W estern District of Oklahoma case Nos. CIV-05-110, CIV-06-510, or CIV-06-652, or any further pro se appeals related to the subject matter of these three cases, except as noted herein. So ordered.
Notes
[**] The Honorable M arcia S. Krieger, United States Distriсt Judge for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
[1] Defendants Joseph Harris and Paulette Schultz maintain that M r. Andrews never properly appealed in Oklahoma courts to regain custody of his child or obtain visitation rights. In addition, they maintain that M r. Andrews has not made any of his court-ordered child support payments (or properly sought modification of the child suрport order) and, as a result, has an extant warrant for felony child support charges. W e need not address, let alone resolve, any of these contentions here.
[2] A district court may dismiss a case
sua sponte
under Federal Rule C ivil
Procedure 12(b) “when it is ‘patently obvious’ that the plaintiff could not prevail
on the facts alleged.”
M cKinney v. State of Okla., Dept. of Human Servs.,
Shawnee O K
,
[3] As part оf his second law suit, M r. Andrews also filed three separate motions to strike and tw o motions to recuse or disqualify in June 2006, two motions to strike in July 2006, one motion to strike in August 2006, one motion to strike in September 2006, and a motion to “Demand this Court Read All Pleadings Plaintiff Files W ith This Court, and Adhere Only to Constitutionally Compliant Law and Case Law, and M ore Particularly, The Bill of Rights in its Rulings” in September 2006.
[4] Judge Downеs was also asked to sit by designation to preside over the remainder of M r. Andrews’s second lawsuit. Although Judge Russell had already effectively dismissed M r. Andrews’s second complaint, judgment had not yet been entered in the second law suit, presumably because the 20-day period to file an amended complaint had been tolled while the district court considered M r. Andrеws’s motion to vacate. Judge D ownes proceeded to consolidate the two cases and then dismissed the consolidated law suit. This sequence of events creates some confusion in the record because Judge Downes’s order in the consolidated case technically appears to “redismiss” the already dismissed second cоmplaint. There are at least two plausible explanations for this apparent discrepancy. First, Judge Downes treated the third complaint as if it were the amended complaint Judge Russell had ordered to be filed, or, more likely, Judge Downes’s order simply addressed the only claims remaining in the consolidated lawsuit, i.e. , the claims contained in the third cоmplaint. None of this, however, is material to our decision.
[5] Although it is difficult to discern from his filings, in just over a month between the initiation of his third lawsuit and Judge D ownes’s orders consolidating and dismissing that case, M r. Andrews appears to have filed approximately five motions for summary judgment, three motions to strike, two motions for default judgment, three motions to recuse or disqualify, and one objection to an entry of appearance. Subsequently, in the almost two months between M r. Andrews’s filing of the motion to reconsider Judge Downes’s order and Judge Downes’s denial of that order, M r. Andrews filed an additional eight self-styled motions and objections in that case.
[6] To the extent that M r. Andrews asserts a
qui tam
action in his third
complaint, this claim also is meritless because
qui tam
actions cover “‘fraudulent
attempts to cause the
Government to pay out
sums of money.’”
United States ex
rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc.
,
[7] W e have reviewed as w ell the many and various motions filed by M r. Andrews in connection with his pending appeals and find them equally without (continued...)
[7] (...continued) merit.
[8] In reaching our conclusion on this score we, of course, do not hold, or remotely mean to suggest, that broader pro se filing restrictions can never be justified even as an initial matter.
[9] The district court’s order requiring advance rеview of pro se filings suggests, at one point, that it applies to proposed appeals . Dist. Ct. Order of July 26, 2006, at 9. The order elsewhere clarifies, however, that it pertains only to filings in the W estern District of Oklahoma. Id. at 9, 11. In any event, it is settled in this circuit that “[i]t is unreasonable for [a district court] to attempt to limit access to this court or any other court of appeals. W e are capable of deciding if filing restrictions are appropriate in this court.” Sieverding , 469 F.3d at 1344.
[10] This court has the pow er to impose still further sanctions such as costs,
attorney fees, and double costs for the filing of frivolous appeals, as well as an
outright ban on certain appeals, whether
pro se
or counseled.
See
Fed. R. App. P.
38;
Van Sickle
,