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Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Department of Homeland Security
999 F. Supp. 2d 24
D.D.C.
2013
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Background

  • EPIC requested DHS Standard Operating Procedure 303 (SOP 303) and related shutdown-checklist and implementation protocols under FOIA.
  • DHS initially found no records on administrative appeal, then located one responsive document: SOP 303, which included the checklist and executing protocols.
  • DHS released a small portion (names/contacts) and withheld the remainder under FOIA Exemptions 7(E) and 7(F); some personal data was withheld under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) (unchallenged).
  • EPIC sued for disclosure; both parties moved for summary judgment. EPIC argued 7(E) and 7(F) do not permit withholding; DHS defended both exemptions.
  • The Court found DHS’s search and withholding under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) adequate but concluded DHS improperly relied on 7(E) and 7(F) to withhold SOP 303.
  • Court ordered release of SOP 303 with only Exemptions 6 and 7(C) redactions, stayed 30 days to permit DHS to seek appeal or alternative remedies (e.g., classification or legislation).

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Applicability of Exemption 7(E) ("techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions") SOP 303 is preventive/protective, not an investigative technique; 7(E) does not cover it. SOP 303 furthers law-enforcement purposes and disclosure would reveal sensitive techniques/procedures that thwart prevention. Court: 7(E) does not cover preventive/protective measures like SOP 303; 7(E) requires investigative/prosecutorial techniques, so DHS misapplied 7(E).
Applicability of Exemption 7(F) (danger to life or physical safety) Disclosure would not target identifiable individuals; group claimed by DHS (anyone in a bomb blast radius) is too diffuse. Releasing SOP 303 would enable bad actors, increasing risk to individuals near unexploded bombs; harms are foreseeable. Court: 7(F) requires some reasonable specificity about who would be endangered; DHS’s ‘‘anyone in a blast radius’’ is too broad, so 7(F) unjustified.
Segregability of non-exempt portions EPIC asserted DHS must release segregable, non-exempt text. DHS had asserted exemptions; argued no releasable portions beyond what it provided. Court: Because DHS failed on 7(E)/7(F), court did not need to decide segregability in detail and ordered disclosure except for redactions under Exemptions 6 and 7(C).
Adequacy of DHS search EPIC did not contest adequacy of search. DHS: search was adequate and SOP 303 was the only responsive document. Court: Search was adequate (not disputed) and only SOP 303 was responsive.

Key Cases Cited

  • Milner v. Department of the Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011) (FOIA exemptions construed narrowly; distinguishing law-enforcement "purposes" from subparagraph activities)
  • ACLU v. Department of Defense, 543 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008) (7(F) requires identification of at least one individual with reasonable specificity)
  • Keys v. Department of Justice, 830 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (agency need only show colorable nexus between record and law-enforcement duties)
  • Department of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 492 U.S. 136 (1989) (agency bears burden to sustain withholding; FOIA exemptions read narrowly)
  • Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989) (courts review FOIA de novo; disclosure favored)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: Electronic Privacy Information Center v. Department of Homeland Security
Court Name: District Court, District of Columbia
Date Published: Nov 12, 2013
Citation: 999 F. Supp. 2d 24
Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2013-0260
Court Abbreviation: D.D.C.