71 F.4th 1174
9th Cir.2023Background:
- Efraín Ramírez Muñoz, a Mexican national who overstayed a 1997 visa, obtained and used a U.S. birth certificate and the name "David Vargas" to get a driver's license and work.
- He used Vargas’s identity during two DUI arrests (California 2002; Nebraska 2011), presenting the birth certificate/ID and (according to the agency) claiming U.S. citizenship.
- After one son naturalized, Ramírez applied to adjust status to lawful permanent resident; the IJ denied the application under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) (false claim of U.S. citizenship).
- The BIA affirmed, relying on its Richmond decision that false claims made to avoid removal proceedings qualify as made "for any purpose or benefit under" federal or state law.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed the legal question de novo, rejected the BIA’s Richmond construction as unreasonable, held that "under" means "in accordance with" a particular law (not mere evasion), and remanded for proceedings consistent with that interpretation.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a false claim of U.S. citizenship to local police to avoid deportation falls under §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) ("for any purpose or benefit under" a law) | Ramírez: his intent to avoid removal satisfies the statute per Richmond | DHS: Richmond is correct; avoiding detection/removal is a purpose under the immigration laws | Court: No — "under" requires acting in accordance with a specific law or to obtain a law-authorized benefit; evading the law does not qualify |
| Whether the court should defer to the BIA's Richmond interpretation (Chevron) | Ramírez: BIA's construction is unreasonable and should not be entitled to deference | DHS: Published BIA precedent merits Chevron deference | Court: Declined to afford deference to Richmond because its interpretation of "under" is unreasonable |
| Whether a materiality requirement rescues Richmond's breadth (i.e., false claim must actually affect the benefit sought) | Ramírez: materiality not necessary for him because purpose fails under "under" | DHS: Richmond’s materiality limitation limits overbreadth | Court: Did not adopt or decide Richmond’s materiality rule; unnecessary because "under" fails here |
| Whether false claims made to obtain employment qualify when not made on a Form I-9 | Ramírez: used alias to get work; such misrepresentations can trigger the bar | DHS: employment-related false claims fall within the statute when they invoke employment verification laws | Court: Employment purpose can qualify only when the misrepresentation is made in accordance with the specific law (e.g., I-9 requirement); record here lacks I-9 evidence and BIA did not rely on employment finding |
Key Cases Cited
- Castro v. Attorney General, 671 F.3d 356 (3d Cir. 2012) (criticized BIA’s broad "avoidance of detection" reading and held evasion purpose insufficient)
- Diaz-Jimenez v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2018) (interpreted "under" to mean "in accordance with" a specific law for §1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I))
- Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (textual interpretation principles cited on meaning of words in context)
- Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011) (statutory interpretation and purposes/concerns limitations)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for deference to agency statutory interpretations)
- United States v. Esparza-Ponce, 193 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1999) (criminal analogue constraining interpretation of false-citizenship statements)
- Valadez-Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304 (9th Cir. 2010) (false documents to obtain legal entry qualify under §1182 provision)
- Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019) (avoidance of surplusage and faithful reading of statutes emphasized)