Eduardo Navejar v. Akinola Iyiola
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 10927
| 7th Cir. | 2013Background
- Navejar, an Illinois state prisoner, was involved in a brawl with prison guard Iyiola; after being subdued and handcuffed, he alleges kick, stomp, pepper spray, and denial of adequate medical care.
- Disciplinary charges were brought against Navejar for assaulting staff, leading to loss of one year of good time credits; he challenged the discipline as excessive-force-related procedure.
- Navejar sued Iyiola, Grant, Elberson, and others in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and deliberate indifference to medical needs; discovery was limited by prison security concerns.
- Navejar repeatedly sought recruitment of pro bono counsel; the district court denied these motions, applying an older standard (Gil) rather than the later Pruitt standard, and granted summary judgment to defendants.
- The district court found no genuine dispute on the excessive-force claim and held Heck v. Humphrey barred the claim; Navejar appealed contending the court used the wrong standard and that lack of counsel prejudiced him.
- We reverse, holding the district court abused its discretion by applying the pre-Pruitt standard and by not adequately considering prejudice, remanding for recruitment of counsel and further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court abused discretion in denying recruitment of counsel | Navejar argues district court applied Gil and ignored Pruitt | Iyiola et al. rely on older standards to deny counsel | Yes, district court abused discretion and must reconsider under Pruitt |
| Whether the court used the correct standard to evaluate competence and need for counsel | Navejar lacks representation may affect litigation tasks | Court should not rely on boilerplate statements of complexity | Yes, improper standard used; must assess under Pruitt's individualized test |
| Whether prejudice supports reversal despite potential error | Counsel would likely reveal facts and evidence | No prejudice shown | Yes, prejudice shown; likely outcome could differ with counsel |
| Whether Heck precludes excessive-force claim despite disciplinary findings | Disciplinary findings do not bar §1983 claim as to excess force | Heck bars claims that would negate disciplinary outcome | No, Heck does not bar this claim given the factual context; reversible on other grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (refines standards for appointing counsel in § 1915(e)(1) cases; focuses on plaintiff's capacity and tasks)
- Gil v. Reed, 381 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2004) (early test for appointing counsel; criticized for boilerplate reasoning)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1994) (bar to claims that would imply invalidity of prison discipline)
- Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (U.S. 1997) ( Heck-like rationale for bar when success would imply misstate discipline)
- Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2008) (applies Heck analysis to inmate excessive-force claims)
- Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010) (pro se prisoners face special pleading difficulties)
- Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2010) (transfer to another facility complicates discovery and witness identification)
- Moore v. Mahone, 652 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2011) ( Heck interplay with inmate conduct)
- Darchak v. City of Chicago Bd. of Educ., 580 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2009) (uncorroborated inmate testimony may create genuine issue)