Eduardo Gonzalez v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
689 F. App'x 917
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Eduardo Gonzalez was charged with one count of sexual battery on a child under 12 and two identical counts (Counts 2 and 3) of lewd and lascivious molestation under Fla. Stat. § 800.04(5)(B); the two molestation counts used identical language and elements.
- A jury convicted Gonzalez on all three counts; the trial court imposed consecutive life sentences for each count; the Florida Third DCA affirmed on direct appeal.
- Gonzalez filed a Florida Rule 3.850 postconviction motion asserting, among other grounds, that the two identical molestation convictions violated double jeopardy; the trial court rejected that claim as procedurally barred.
- The State conceded on appeal that double jeopardy claims may be raised in a 3.850 motion, but the Florida appellate court issued a per curiam summary affirmance.
- Gonzalez filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising the double jeopardy claim; the magistrate and district court agreed and granted relief.
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed the district court, holding the two identical convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because they charged the same offense with no distinct elements or factual distinctions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the federal court should apply a "hypothesize" standard (Hittson) or "look through" (Ylst) after a state-court summary affirmance | Gonzalez argued the summary affirmance did not extinguish review of the merits and sought de novo review | State urged application of Hittson/hypothesize requiring petitioner to show no reasonable basis for affirmance | Court applied Ylst/look-through because the last reasoned state opinion imposed a procedural bar, so presumption is that the summary affirmance rested on that bar |
| Whether the Florida appellate court’s summary affirmance is entitled to AEDPA deference | Gonzalez contended presumption that affirmance rested on procedural bar was not rebutted, so no deference applies | State claimed its concession to the appellate court meant the summary affirmance was on the merits and merits deference applies | Court held State failed to rebut Ylst presumption with strong evidence; no §2254(d) deference; de novo review applied |
| Whether the two identical convictions for lewd and lascivious molestation violate Double Jeopardy under Blockburger | Gonzalez argued identical counts with identical elements and no factual differentiation constitute the same offense, barring multiple punishments | State argued Florida law permits multiple punishments for distinct acts and trial record shows separate touchings during same episode, so no double jeopardy | Court held Blockburger bars multiple punishments here: identically charged counts with no distinct elements or factual distinctions violated Double Jeopardy |
| Whether courts may look beyond the indictment/conviction form to distinguish counts (citing Marable/Ward) | Gonzalez argued courts should not extend conspiracy-case exceptions to this state-law context | State relied on Marable/Ward to justify examining trial record to identify distinct acts | Court refused to extend Marable/Ward beyond conspiracy context; declined fact-based deviation and affirmed double jeopardy violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991) (presumption that a later summary state-court decision rests on the last reasoned opinion; rebuttable only with strong evidence)
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (test for whether two offenses are the same for double jeopardy purposes: each statute must require proof of an element the other does not)
- Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (Double Jeopardy forbids multiple punishments for the same offense)
- Wilson v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 834 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016) (application of Ylst to summary denials; look-through to last reasoned decision)
- United States v. Marable, 578 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1978) (conspiracy-case analysis allowing limited inquiry beyond indictment; not extended to this state-law context)