Edmond Paul Price v. Amy Miller, 2:14-cv-06307

Background

Price was convicted by a San Luis Obispo County jury (2010) of multiple counts of check forgery/counterfeiting and of committing felonies while on bail; sentenced to 10 years 4 months. State appeals and habeas petitions were denied.
Facts: Price cashed or attempted to cash multiple forged checks drawn on nonprofit South County and Rovenstine Roofing accounts; police intercepted several attempts and arrested him after multiple deposits and cash-back transactions.
Defense theory: Michael Fleming (who gave Price forged Rovenstine checks) testified he owed Price a legitimate loan and gave checks to repay it; defense suggested the checks were received in payment for other (allegedly illicit) activity and argued lack of intent to commit forgery.
Key trial events: defense counsel questioned jurors about drug-related bias, made opening remarks suggesting certain checks were tied to illegal transactions, sought counsel for Fleming, and called Fleming as a witness; the jury convicted on several counts and hung on others.
Procedural posture in federal court: Price filed a §2254 habeas petition raising five main ineffective-assistance and trial-error claims; the magistrate judge denied the petition on the merits under AEDPA.

Issues

Issue	Price's Argument	Miller (Respondent)'s Argument	Held
1) Whether defense counsel’s voir dire/opening remarks (suggesting drug dealings and portraying Fleming’s role) were inflammatory and rendered assistance ineffective	Counsel’s remarks branded Fleming a liar, instructed Fleming to give false testimony, and prejudiced jurors before evidence	Remarks were supported by trial record as reasonable strategy to identify unbiased jurors; no evidence counsel told Fleming to lie; Fleming had independent counsel and testified; no prejudice given strong inculpatory evidence	Denied — no deficiency or prejudice under Strickland; state courts’ denial reasonable under AEDPA
2) Whether calling Officer Lopez was ineffective (it harmed defense by creating damaging testimony)	Lopez’s testimony contradicted defense expectation that another suspect (Chronister) was not prosecuted, thus harming the theory of selective nonprosecution	Counsel called Lopez for impeachment/credibility of investigation; testimony was marginal and not central; limited use in closing; tactical decision	Denied — reasonable strategy and no prejudice; state decision reasonable
3) Whether Price was improperly prevented from testifying / counsel ineffective for not putting him on stand when he asked late (reopen after closing begun)	Price told counsel he wanted to testify during cross of Fleming; counsel rested and later request to reopen was denied — violated right to testify and counsel ineffective	Request to testify was untimely (after close/beginning of closing); counsel and court record show attempted but belated request; proposed testimony would be cumulative and not address knowledge of forgery; no established federal rule requiring reopening after closing begins	Denied — no clearly established federal-law violation and no Strickland prejudice; state courts reasonably applied rules on reopening and significance of proffered testimony
4) Whether failure to investigate/subpoena bank manager or Roger Feldtmose was ineffective	Counsel failed to interview Rabobank manager and Feldtmose whose testimony would show Price lacked knowledge the South County checks were forged	Trial record showed South County checks were stolen in burglary, Love (executive director) did not know Price and Feldtmose denied making checks or knowing Price; officer testimony and other contacts already showed bank verification; Feldtmose’s likely testimony would not help; counsel did subpoena Shannon Hanson (but she was unavailable)	Denied — no deficient performance shown and no reasonable probability of a different outcome
5) Whether the court’s use of CALCRIM 3406 (reasonableness of defendant’s belief that checks were valid) was reversible error or counsel ineffective for failing to object	Instruction improperly allowed a reasonable mistake-of-fact defense for specific-intent crimes (Price) and prejudiced the jury	Court of Appeal found the instruction erroneous but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming evidence of knowledge and continued passing of forgeries; any counsel omission did not prejudice outcome	Denied — instructional error held harmless; no Strickland prejudice

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (AEDPA deference; state court decision must be objectively unreasonable)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (standard for evaluating counsel performance and prejudice analysis)
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (definition of "clearly established" federal law under AEDPA)
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (defendant’s right to testify and limits on excluding testimony)
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (harmlessness review for jury instructions and due process)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (harmless-error standard for federal habeas review)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (presumption of correctness for state factual findings under §2254(e)(1))