Edgar Riveros-Sanchez v. City of Easton
20-1501
| 3rd Cir. | Jun 14, 2021Background
- Plaintiffs Edgar and Maria Riveros-Sanchez owned a three-unit rental and were required to install a fire-alarm system.
- Plaintiffs allege an oral agreement with a former Fire Marshal allowing delay until Chapter 13 discharge; they negotiated with an alarm company and installed a system in December 2015.
- On July 28, 2015 the City posted a "CLOSED USE FORBIDDEN" sign requiring tenants to vacate within seven days; Plaintiffs say they received no pre-notice and the City did not contact their property manager.
- Even after the alarm was installed and the building passed inspection, Plaintiffs allege the City failed to remove the posting or issue a rental-suitability certificate; the property later went into foreclosure.
- Plaintiffs filed suit in state court alleging federal due process violations, negligence, and tortious interference; the case was removed to federal court, counsel withdrew, Plaintiffs filed a pro se amended complaint naming the City, Fire Chief Bast, and Fire Marshal Price.
- The District Court dismissed the amended complaint (immunity under the PSTCA for tort claims; substantive due process for failing to allege conscience-shocking conduct; procedural due process for failing to allege use of available remedies); Plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| PSTCA immunity for negligence and tortious-interference claims | City and officials negligently caused loss and interfered with contracts by posting sign and not removing it | PSTCA shields local agencies/employees from tort liability absent willful misconduct or statutory exception | Dismissed: PSTCA bars tort claims against City; plaintiffs did not plausibly allege willful misconduct by Bast or Price |
| Substantive due process ("shocks the conscience") | City's posting, eviction, and failure to remove sign violated substantive due process | Conduct amounted to negligence at most, not conscience-shocking abuse of power | Dismissed: Allegations do not rise above negligence and thus fail substantive due process standard |
| Procedural due process / predeprivation notice & emergency exception | Plaintiffs received no predeprivation notice and were denied an opportunity to be heard | Posting and undated letter provided notice; fire code violation was an emergency justifying no predeprivation hearing | Appellate court found factual uncertainty about emergency but affirmed dismissal on other grounds (see SOL and Monell); District Court also faulted plaintiffs for not alleging use of available remedies |
| §1983 individual liability timeliness & municipal Monell liability | Claims against Bast and Price were timely/relate back; City liable because its actions caused harm | §1983 claims governed by two-year statute of limitations; amended complaint naming officials filed too late and does not relate back; Monell requires a municipal policy or custom causing the injury | Affirmed: Claims against Bast and Price are time-barred and do not relate back; Monell claim against City fails for lack of factual allegation of policy or custom |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Samuels, 962 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2020) (de novo review of dismissal motions)
- Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454 (3d Cir. 2015) (appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record)
- Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3d Cir. 1994) (substantive due process requires conscience-shocking conduct)
- Elsmere Park Club, L.P. v. Town of Elsmere, 542 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2008) (predeprivation hearing normally required unless emergency justifies summary action)
- Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2009) (two-year statute of limitations for § 1983 claims in Pennsylvania)
- Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability requires a policy or custom causing the injury)
- Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 2001) (standards for imputing notice to newly added defendants)
- Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2003) (shared-attorney/identity-of-interest test for imputing notice)
- Phillips v. Lock, 86 A.3d 906 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (Pennsylvania rule disallowing addition of a new distinct party after limitations period)
- Bright v. Westmoreland Cty., 443 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2006) (standard for overcoming governmental immunity via willful misconduct)
- Wade v. City of Pittsburgh, 765 F.2d 405 (3d Cir. 1985) (PSTCA does not bar § 1983 claims but addresses state tort immunity)