Eau Claire County Department of Human Services v. S. E., 2021 WI 56

In June 2016 Eau Claire County removed three‑year‑old Tyler from his mother Sophie’s care; an August 2016 CHIPS dispositional order provided written TPR warnings referencing the then‑current § 48.415(2)(a)3 (2015–16).
Sophie repeatedly failed to meet court‑ordered conditions (continued drug use, arrests, lack of participation in services) and had little or no contact with Tyler after October 2016.
In April 2018 the legislature amended § 48.415(2)(a)3, replacing a forward‑looking 9‑month evaluation with a rule that if a child has been outside the home for 15 of the most recent 22 months the petitioner need not prove a substantial likelihood the parent will fail to meet conditions in the future (the "15 of 22" rule).
The Department filed a TPR petition in June 2018 and amended it in September 2018 to add continuing CHIPS under the amended statute; the circuit court applied the amended statute and held the 15/22 timeframe began to run from Sophie's 2016 CHIPS notice.
The court of appeals affirmed; the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the court of appeals — holding the amended 15/22 timeframe applied and that its application did not violate due process.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (S.E.)	Defendant's Argument (Department)	Held
Whether the "15 of 22 months" timeframe begins only after the parent receives written notice of the 2018 amendment	The 15/22 period should start only when the parent receives written notice of the amended statute (i.e., after the statute change and corresponding warnings)	The CHIPS order need only warn of the grounds that "may be applicable" at the time it is entered; Sophie received CHIPS warnings in 2016 that included continuing CHIPS and the subparts, so the 15/22 period ran from that notice	Court held the timeframe began when Sophie received the written CHIPS notice in 2016; the amended statute applied to the pending TPR petition
Whether applying the amended statute retroactively or starting the timeframe from the 2016 order violates due process / fair notice	Applying the amended rule would be retroactive and deprive Sophie of fair notice of a new, more restrictive timeframe (and thus of a meaningful opportunity to comply)	The amendment did not attach new legal consequences or create new obligations; Sophie remained subject to the same reunification conditions and had adequate notice that her rights were at risk	Court held no impermissible retroactivity and no due process violation; prior statutory notice and conditions were sufficient

Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (test for whether statute has retroactive effect: whether it attaches new legal consequences to past events)
Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 271 Wis. 2d 633 (2004) (principles for statutory interpretation; legislative purpose is relevant)
Waukesha Cnty. v. Steven H., 233 Wis. 2d 344 (2000) (notice under § 48.356 is meant to inform parents of conditions for return and to forewarn that parental rights are in jeopardy)
Matthies v. Positive Safety Mfg. Co., 244 Wis. 2d 720 (2001) (Wisconsin two‑step analysis for retroactivity inquiries)
State v. Stephenson, 394 Wis. 2d 703 (2020) (standard of review: independent review for statutory interpretation)
State v. Patricia A.P., 195 Wis. 2d 855 (Ct. App. 1995) (due process violation where statutory change substantially altered the quality of conduct leading to TPR)
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parental rights receive heightened due process protection)