Eastman Kodak v. Bath, 936 F.3d 86

Background

Plaintiffs are manufacturers who bought primary aluminum under long‑term supply contracts that priced metal using the LME cash price plus a Platts Midwest Premium (a delivery/transport/storage cost component).
Financial Defendants (J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Glencore) traded and held large physical aluminum positions and purchased U.S. LME warehouses in 2010; Warehousing Defendants (Henry Bath, Metro, Pacorini) operated LME‑certified warehouses.
Plaintiffs allege the defendants conspired to inflate the Midwest Premium (by delaying deliveries, capping load‑outs, canceling warrants and shuttling metal) to raise the price at which Financial Defendants could sell their aluminum, causing plaintiffs to pay inflated prices under their contracts.
The MDL district court dismissed related End User claims in Aluminum III for lack of antitrust standing; it later relied on Aluminum III to grant summary judgment here, concluding the alleged restraint was primarily in the warehousing market while plaintiffs’ injuries were in the primary aluminum market.
The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment: it held these plaintiffs adequately alleged antitrust injury because the alleged conspiracy targeted a price component of primary aluminum sales (the Midwest Premium), and plaintiffs bought in that same market.
The panel also vacated the district court’s denial of leave to amend for Reynolds/Southwire as based on the same erroneous legal premise and instructed the district court to reconsider any amendment request on proper standards.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs pleaded antitrust injury/standing	Plaintiffs argue defendants restrained the market for the sale of primary aluminum by manipulating the Midwest Premium, directly harming purchasers who paid that price component.	Defendants contend the restraint occurred 'first and foremost' in the warehousing services market; plaintiffs who buy outside that market lack antitrust injury and are inefficient enforcers.	The court held plaintiffs alleged antitrust injury: the conspiracy targeted a price component of primary aluminum sales, and plaintiffs bought in that same market.
Applicability of Aluminum III to these plaintiffs	Plaintiffs claim Aluminum III (dismissal of remote End Users) is distinguishable because their purchases were in the primary aluminum market the defendants sought to affect.	Defendants claim Aluminum III compels dismissal because the initial locus of restraint was warehousing, making plaintiffs’ injuries incidental.	The court rejected defendants’ reading: Aluminum III does not apply where the alleged anticompetitive objective and the plaintiffs’ purchases are in the same market.
Characterization of the restrained market (warehousing vs. primary aluminum)	Plaintiffs emphasize that inflating the Midwest Premium was the objective to raise resale prices in the primary aluminum market; warehousing delay was the means.	Defendants emphasize warehousing bottlenecks were the substantive restraint and plaintiffs have no injury in that market.	The court held the warehousing conduct was the means, not the end; liability can extend to injuries in the market the defendants intended to restrain (primary aluminum).
Denial of leave to amend (Reynolds/Southwire)	Reynolds/Southwire sought leave to amend after Aluminum III and some discovery, asserting they could plead viable claims.	District court denied as futile based on its Aluminum III‑based holding.	The court vacated the futility denial and remanded for reconsideration under proper standards because the underlying holding was erroneous.

Key Cases Cited

In re Aluminum Warehousing Antitrust Litig., 833 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal of remote end‑user claims for lack of antitrust standing)
Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (U.S. 1983) (establishes antitrust standing framework and efficient‑enforcer concept)
Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (U.S. 1982) (antitrust injury can include harms "inextricably intertwined" with conspirators' objective even if plaintiff is not a market participant)
United States v. Socony‑Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (U.S. 1940) (price‑fixing and tampering with price structures is unlawful)
Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 823 F.3d 759 (2d Cir. 2016) (fixing a price component violates antitrust laws and causes cognizable injury)
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015) (price‑fixing conspiracies are illegal per se; precise mechanism is immaterial)