East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis
633 F.3d 459
6th Cir.2011Background
- 1991 Memphis ordinance imposed licensing for adult businesses to control secondary effects.
- 1996 consent judgment adopted Sixth Circuit ruling as final on constitutionality, effectively pausing enforcement.
- 1996 consent judgment left the ordinance in place but unenforced and no permits required.
- 2007 Shelby County Act created county-wide licensing regime for adult establishments, with broader regulatory framework.
- 2008 Memphis enforcement limited by Act's preemption clause; County Ordinance later became the more restrictive scheme.
- 60(b) motion filed 2008 to relieve judgment; district court denied relief and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether intervening changes in law justify relief under Rule 60(b)(5). | Cooper relies on Littleton and writs of certiorari change. | Defendants argue changes cure only some defects, not all; severability issues remain. | No relief under 60(b)(5) for remaining defects. |
| Whether the shareholder disclosure provision is severable from the consent decree. | Disclosing management shares overlaps with other provisions. | Shareholder disclosure essential to regulatory purposes. | Shareholder disclosure not severable; district court proper on severability. |
| Whether the peaceful-manner and amortization provisions are severable and relief is warranted. | These provisions are redundant or contrary to state law; severance should be allowed. | Provisions severable; court erred in striking them. | Peaceful-manner and amortization severable; relief denied for 60(b)(5) other reasons. |
| Whether the equities support relief from judgment. | Equities favor Memphis operating under the Memphis Ordinance. | Equities do not favor relief; County Ordinance already addresses most issues. | Equities not dispositive; relief denied. |
| Whether the district court correctly denied relief given intervening law. | Intervening law invalidates the need for strict enforcement. | Intervening law does not cure all defects; control remains with judgment. | District court acted within discretion; relief denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 1995) (invalidated parts of Memphis Ordinance; warning about amendments and review)
- Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk Cnty. Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (U.S. 1992) (standard for modifying consent decrees based on changed circumstances)
- City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (severability of local ordinances is a question of state law)
- Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 466 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2006) (expedited certiorari clears First Amendment review timelines)
- Brown v. Tennessee Dept. of Finance and Admin., 561 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 2009) (equities not sole determinant in Rule 60(b) analysis)
- Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193 (1950) (exceptional circumstances required for Rule 60(b)(6) relief)
- Huguley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 999 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1993) (review of consent decree interpretations)
- Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983) (continuation of jurisdiction over consent decree)
