Eason v. Marine Terminals Corp.
309 Ga. App. 669
Ga. Ct. App.2011Background
- Plaintiffs Eason, Brown, Green, and Sheffield allege invasion of privacy and defamation against MTC, Concentra, Ceres, Georgia Stevedore Association, and Jenkins.
- Claims arise from administration of drug and alcohol screening policies set forth in collective bargaining agreements.
- Random drug and alcohol testing was conducted February–March 2005; some results were false positives.
- Plaintiffs allege public disclosure/posting of test results violated privacy and that false positives defamed them; Jenkins allegedly slandered Eason.
- Trial court dismissed for failure to exhaust contract remedies and for pleading deficiencies; court found some claims intertwined with contract interpretation and thus preempted under § 301 LMRA.
- Court of Appeals reverses in part: defamation privacy issues are preempted as intertwined with contract terms, but Eason’s individual slander claim against Jenkins remains viable.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether claims are preempted under § 301 LMRA | Plaintiffs contend state tort claims are independent of contracts. | Defendants argue claims require contract interpretation and are preempted. | Preemption depends on whether claims require contract interpretation; some claims intertwined, others not. |
| Whether invasion of privacy claims are preempted | Privacy claims arise from how testing was conducted, not contract terms. | Administration of testing procedures governed by contracts; requires contract interpretation. | Invasion of privacy preempted due to need to interpret testing provisions within the collective bargaining agreements. |
| Whether defamation claims are preempted | Defamation arises from publication of test results independent of contract. | Publications were governed by duties under the contract; privileged/restricted by agreement. | Defamation claim preempted because resolution requires examining rights/obligations under the contract. |
| Whether Jenkins’ individual slander claim can proceed | Jenkins’ statements outside scope of contract may be actionable. | Slander within scope of private, intra-corporate investigations may be privileged under contract. | Eason’s slander claim against Jenkins individually survives to extent outside contract privileges; other claims affirmed to be dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1988) (preemption when contract interpretation is required)
- Dugger v. Miller Brewing Co., 199 Ga.App. 850 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (test for § 301 preemption whether claim is independent of contract)
- Wright v. Universal Maritime Svc. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (U.S. 1998) (arbitration provision issue under ADA, not preemption of discrimination claim)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1985) (interpretation of contract terms necessary to determine reasonableness)
- Clark v. Newport News Shipbuilding, 937 F.2d 934 (4th Cir. 1991) (preemption when evaluating reasonableness of contract-driven duties)
- Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1988) (intra-corporate communications privileged if in good faith under contract)
- Garley v. Sandia Corp., 236 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2001) (§ 301 preempts state defamation claims arising from contract duties)
- DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (6th Cir. 1994) (defamation publications tied to duties under collective bargaining agreements)
- Luecke v. Schnucks Markets, 85 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 1996) (defamation action not preempted when contract silent on testing policy)