Robert Eason, Reginald Brown, Dahral Green and Arthur Sheffield appeal the dismissal of their lawsuit against Marine Terminals Corporation (“MTC”), Concentra Medical International, Ceres Marine Terminals, Inc., Georgia Stevedore Association and H. Curtis Jenkins III. The plaintiffs’ claims are for invasion of privacy and defamation. The claims arise out of defendants’ administration of drug and alcohol screening policies, which are set out in collective bargaining agreements. The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, finding that the plaintiffs had not exhausted the remedies in their collective bargaining agreements and that the complaint was deficient. Because some but not all of the plaintiffs’ claims require the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements, and thus are preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 USC § 185 and because the complaint was sufficient under the notice pleading standard, we affirm in part and reverse in part.
A court may dismiss a complaint
only where [the] complaint shows with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of facts that could be proven in support of his claim. We review the dismissal de novo, construing the complaint’s allegations and all possible inferences therefrom in favor of the plaintiff.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Northeast Ga. Cancer Care v. Blue Cross &c. of Ga.,
The plaintiffs were tested under this policy in February and March 2005. Eason’s, Brown’s and Green’s test results came back false positive. According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, “Ceres and MTC posted the drug test results.”
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants violated their rights to privacy by testing them in the open, in the presence of other employees, thereby subjecting their private medical information to public scrutiny. They contend that their rights to privacy were further violated when the defendants posted their drug test results in public.
In addition, Eason, Brown and Green contend that the posting of false positive test results amounted to defamation because it created the impression that they had engaged in criminal behavior. And Eason contends that defendant Jenkins slandered him by telling others about the drug test results.
The plaintiffs attached to their complaint a copy of the random drug and alcohol testing policy which provided that, “[disputes arising from the administration of this program shall be subject to the grievance procedure.”
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs were required to exhaust the remedies in the collective bargaining agreements before filing suit. The plaintiffs countered that their claims are based exclusively on state law, not the parties’ collective bargaining agreements. The trial court determined that the plaintiffs’ claims concern the application and interpretation of the random drug testing provision in the collective bargaining agreements. Concluding that the claims are “inextricably intertwined with interpretation of the drug testing policy,” the court found them to be subject to the grievance procedures and mandatory arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreements. The trial court also found that the plaintiffs’ complaint was “woefully deficient.” The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss. The *671 plaintiffs then filed this appeal.
1. If the trial court correctly determined that the plaintiffs’ claims are inextricably intertwined with the random drug testing policy of the collective bargaining agreements, thereby requiring interpretation of the agreements, it follows that the claims are preempted by federal labor law, and the trial court properly dismissed the complaint. “[A]n application of state law is preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ... if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement.”
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
The issue, then, is whether the plaintiffs’ complaint alleging torts based on Georgia law requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements. We note that the case upon which the plaintiffs primarily rely,
Wright v. Universal Maritime Svc. Corp.,
In determining whether the plaintiffs’ state tort law claims require interpretation of the terms of the collective bargaining agreements, we first look to the elements of the state law claims.
Lightning v. Roadway Express,
(a) The plaintiffs first allege the tort of invasion of privacy. That tort protects
the right to be free from unwarranted publicity as well as from the publicizing of one’s private affairs with which the public has no legitimate concern. There are at least three elements necessary to recovery for an invasion of one’s right of privacy: (a) the disclosure of private facts must be a public disclosure; (b) the facts disclosed to the public must be private, secluded or secret facts and not public ones; (c) the matter made public must be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable man of ordinary sensibilities under the circumstances.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Dortch v. Atlanta Journal &c.,
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants violated their rights to privacy by testing them in the open, in the presence of other employees, thereby subjecting their private medical information to public scrutiny and by posting their drug test results in public. Determining whether this conduct was reasonable under the circumstances — circumstances that include the existence of drug testing provisions in the collective bargaining agreements — requires interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements themselves. The parties’ agreements as to the manner in which the defendants would administer the random drug testing policy are necessarily relevant to any allegation that the policy was administered in a tortious manner. See
Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck,
(b) The four elements of the tort of defamation are: “(1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault by the defendant amounting at least to negligence; and (4) special harm or the actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm.” (Punctuation omitted.)
Bollea v. World Championship Wrestling,
*673
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ posting of Eason’s, Brown’s and Green’s false positive test results amounted to a defamation because it created the impression that they had engaged in criminal behavior and exposed them to public hatred, contempt and ridicule. When determining whether a state defamation claim is preempted under § 301, “courts look beyond the allegations of the complaint to determine whether the wrong complained of actually arises in some manner from the breach of the defendants’ obligations under a collective bargaining agreement.” (Punctuation omitted.)
Garley v. Sandia Corp.,
(c) Under OCGA § 51-5-4 (a), slander, or oral defamation, consists of
(1) Imputing to another a crime punishable by law; (2) Charging a person with having some contagious disorder or with being guilty of some debasing act which may exclude him from society; (3) Making charges against another in reference to his trade, office, or profession, calculated to injure him therein; or (4) Uttering any disparaging words productive of special damage which flows naturally therefrom.
Eason contends that defendant Jenkins is liable individually and as a union business agent for slandering him by telling others about his false positive drug test result, causing others to speculate whether Eason was engaged in illegal drug use. To the extent Eason asserts claims against Jenkins in his capacity as a union business
*674
agent, it is necessary to interpret the collective bargaining agreements to determine whether Jenkins’s statements were privileged as the good faith performance of a legal duty. OCGA § 51-5-7 (2); see also
Lewis v. Meredith Corp.,
*674 To the extent Eason contends that Jenkins made statements in his individual capacity to individuals outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreements, then those statements would have been made outside the scope of Jenkins’s employment, and they would not be privileged as the good faith performance of a legal duty. Consequently, no interpretation of the collective bargaining agreements is required, and Eason may proceed on this claim. See Meier v. Hamilton Standard Electronic Systems, 748 FSupp. 296, 299 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (plaintiffs contentions that defamatory statements were made to individuals who were outside the scope of the employer’s collective bargaining agreement and thus who would not have had a legitimate interest in them were not “inextricably intertwined” or “substantially dependent” on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement).
2. To the extent that the trial court dismissed Eason’s slander claim against Jenkins individually on the ground that it was “woefully deficient,” we reverse. The complaint included all that was required, namely “a short and plain statement of the claim that [gave] the defendants] fair notice of what the claim [was] and a general indication of the type of litigation involved; the discovery process bears the burden of filling in details.”
Dillingham v. Doctors Clinic, P.A.,
For these reasons, we reverse the grant of the motion to dismiss Eason’s slander claim against Jenkins individually. We affirm the grant of the motion to dismiss the remainder of the plaintiffs’ claims.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.