Easaw v. Newport
253 F. Supp. 3d 22
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Audrey Easaw, an African‑American former AARP employee, alleges defendants Debbie Newport and Calade Partners (AARP consultants) influenced AARP to rewrite Easaw’s job description and terminate her effective July 8, 2016.
- Easaw contends Newport spoke to her in an abrasive tone, excluded her from meetings, delayed responses, and influenced hiring/promotions that disadvantaged her.
- AARP retained Newport/Calade in 2015 to help launch “AARP Experience”; Easaw’s duties shifted and others (including an African‑American VP) were hired or promoted within the new unit.
- Easaw filed claims under the D.C. Human Rights Act (race discrimination) and for tortious interference with employment against Newport and Calade; defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- The court dismissed the DCHRA race discrimination claim for failure to plead facts giving rise to a plausible inference of discriminatory motive by the named defendants.
- The court denied dismissal of the tortious interference claim, holding D.C. law (as clarified by the D.C. Court of Appeals) permits tortious interference claims against third parties even when the employment is at‑will.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants can be liable under DCHRA for race discrimination | Easaw alleges defendants caused her termination and hostile treatment, so plead discrimination suffices at motion to dismiss stage | Defendants argue they are not her "employer" under DCHRA and complaint lacks facts to infer race‑based motive | Dismissed: complaint fails to plead sufficient factual allegations to plausibly infer discriminatory motive by defendants |
| Whether alleged acts (tone, exclusion, delayed responses, job‑rewrite) suffice as adverse actions giving rise to discrimination inference | Easaw points to exclusion, job rewrite, and termination as adverse actions | Defendants: many alleged acts are non‑ultimate/ordinary workplace disputes and lack causal link to race; no discriminatory remarks alleged | Dismissed: these allegations are insufficient to "nudge" a discrimination claim to plausibility |
| Whether a third party consultant can be sued for tortious interference with at‑will employment under D.C. law | Easaw argues third parties who improperly cause termination can be liable even if employment is at‑will | Defendants contend at‑will employment precludes tortious interference claims and they are not a third party because affiliated with AARP | Survives: following Newmyer (D.C. Ct. App.), D.C. law allows tortious interference claims against third parties as to at‑will employment; dismissal denied |
| Whether D.C. Circuit precedent controlling or must follow later D.C. Court of Appeals decisions on state law conflict | Easaw relies on D.C. COA Newmyer; defendants rely on earlier D.C. Circuit/metz rulings | Defendants urge deference to D.C. Circuit; plaintiff urges deference to most recent D.C. COA authority | Court applies most recent D.C. COA decision (Newmyer) and holds federal courts must follow the D.C. COA when it clearly addresses state law |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim, not mere conclusions)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must contain enough facts to nudge claims from conceivable to plausible)
- Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002) (plaintiff need not plead McDonnell Douglas prima facie case at pleading stage)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden‑shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination evidence)
- Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 562 U.S. 411 (2011) (‘‘cat’s paw’’ liability—subordinate’s biased action that proximately causes adverse decision can impose liability)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (plaintiff may show employer’s reason was pretext)
- Burley v. Nat’l Passenger Rail Corp., 801 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (discusses cat’s paw and causal link requirements)
- Metz v. BAE Sys. Tech. Sols. & Servs., Inc., 774 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discusses D.C. law on tortious interference with at‑will employment)
- Newmyer v. Sidwell Friends Sch., 128 A.3d 1023 (D.C. 2015) (D.C. Court of Appeals permits tortious interference claims against third parties for at‑will employment)
- Sorrells v. Garfinckel’s, 565 A.2d 285 (D.C. 1989) (allowing supervisor liability for malicious interference with employment)