Earl v. Ohio Elections Comm.
2016 Ohio 7071
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Charles Earl, Libertarian candidate for Ohio governor in 2014, was removed from the ballot after the Ohio Secretary of State sustained a protest alleging nondisclosure by paid petition circulators.
- Earl later filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission (OEC) alleging coordination between Terry Casey and the Kasich campaign and an improper in-kind contribution tied to Casey’s hiring of the Zeiger law firm.
- At the OEC preliminary review (full commission), members heard argument, reviewed pleadings and exhibits, but took no testimony; the commission voted 5–2 to grant respondents’ motion to dismiss.
- After dismissal, Earl obtained additional discovery and sought rehearing; the OEC denied rehearing and Earl appealed to the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas under R.C. 119.12.
- The trial court dismissed Earl’s administrative appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding the OEC’s dismissal at the preliminary-review stage was an executive (probable-cause) determination not subject to R.C. 119.12 appeal.
- The Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the full commission acted in its executive/preliminary-review role (insufficiency/probable-cause determination), so no right to appeal existed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Earl) | Defendant's Argument (OEC / Respondents) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a dismissal by the full OEC at preliminary review is appealable under R.C. 119.12 | Earl: dismissal was a merits/adjudicative decision by the full commission and thus appealable | OEC/Respondents: the vote was a preliminary-review determination (jurisdiction/sufficiency/probable cause), an executive act not appealable | Held: Dismissal was an executive probable-cause/sufficiency determination and not appealable under R.C. 119.12 |
| Whether the commission’s letter/options converted a preliminary review into a final adjudication | Earl: OEC’s stated options (including “find there has been a violation”) show capacity to decide merits | OEC/Respondents: the administrative rule permits those options at preliminary stage; here commission acted under the preliminary-review function | Held: Options in the letter track the preliminary-review rule; record shows commission remained in executive role |
| Whether the record shows the commission made a probable-cause finding (thus creating appeal rights) | Earl: transcripts and evidence could indicate a merits determination or at least sufficient grounds to treat dismissal as on the merits | OEC/Respondents: transcript questions and motions focused on insufficiency/lack of coordination; no probable-cause finding was made | Held: Record demonstrates dismissal for lack of sufficient evidence/probable cause, not a merits adjudication |
| Whether the common pleas court applied proper precedent/test in reviewing appealability | Earl: trial court misapplied Common Cause precedent and should have treated dismissal as adjudicative | OEC/Respondents: prior Tenth District precedent supports dismissals at preliminary review as nonappealable | Held: Trial court correctly applied precedent (Robinson, Common Cause I & II, Billis) and lacked jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Common Cause/Ohio v. Ohio Elections Comm., 150 Ohio App.3d 31 (2002) (explains when commission moves beyond preliminary review and a probable-cause finding creates appeal rights)
- Common Cause/Ohio v. Ohio Elections Comm., 156 Ohio App.3d 544 (2004) (reiterates distinction between executive preliminary-review determinations and adjudicative findings that are appealable)
- Billis v. Ohio Elections Comm., 146 Ohio App.3d 360 (2001) (holds preliminary-review dismissals for lack of probable cause are not adjudications subject to R.C. 119.12 appeal)