Billis v. Ohio Elections CommissionBillis v. Ohio Elections Commission
Appellant, John Billis, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his appeal from an action of appellee, the Ohio Elections Commission, dismissing his complaint.
Appellant filed a complaint/affidavit with appellee, alleging that State Representative Lynn Olman violated
Appellant filed an appeal with the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on March 21, 2000. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss on June 9, 2000. Both parties filed competing memoranda, as well as filing their merit briefs and responsive pleadings. On February 15, 2001, the common pleas court issued a decision granting appellee’s motion to dismiss. The common pleas court found that, because the dismissal arose from a preliminary review and not a hearing, there was no right to appeal from the dismissal because it was not a final appealable order. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
On appeal, appellant asserts one assignment of error:
*362 “The trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion to dismiss.”
Appellant was a candidate for the Ohio House of Representatives in the 51st House District, and Olman was his opponent. In December 1999, Olman directed a campaign assistant to send a fundraising letter to a group of lobbyists. However, the campaign assistant on his own initiative downloaded a list of all registered lobbyists, including public employees, and sent the letter to the entire list. Several of the letters were sent to public employees at their place of employment, and two of these individuals responded with contributions. On January 4, 2000, Olman became aware that the campaign assistant had expanded the mailing beyond the original list, and he returned the contributions and sent a letter to appellee explaining what had happened. Apparently, Olman discussed the incident with a reporter from The Toledo Blade, which ran a story about the incident on January 7, 2000.
In appellant’s single assignment of error, he argues that the common pleas court erred by dismissing his appeal. We disagree.
Although appellant brings his appeal under
Appellant argues that the common pleas court erred by dismissing his appeal in that
There is no inherent right to appeal from an action of an administrative agency absent constitutional or statutory authority.
State ex rel. Citizens for Van Meter v. Ohio Elections Comm.
(1992),
The procedure for a preliminary review by a probable cause panel or the full commission is delineated in
A review of the transcript indicates that the procedures under
In
Van Meter
at 294,
“The general lack of any appeal from commission decisions makes sense because, by and large, the commission acts in an investigatory capacity, much like a prosecutor or grand jury. See Dewine v. Ohio Elections Comm. (1978),61 Ohio App.2d 25 ,15 O.O.3d 28 ,399 N.E.2d 99 . Typically, when an agency conducts such investigations and does not find a violation of the law, this determination is not subject to any judicial review because it is not an adjudication. Ohio Assn. of Pub. School Emp., Chapter 643, AFSCME, AFL-CIO v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991),59 Ohio St.3d 159 ,572 N.E.2d 80 ; Hanson v. Fabe (Dec. 10, 1991), Franklin App. No. 91AP-435, unreported,1991 WL 268739 . * * *”
While the General Assembly has altered the legislative scheme creating the Ohio Elections Commission since this court’s decision in Van Meter, the same reasoning applies to the current statutory scheme. As appellee argues, there is no provision for anyone to appeal from an action of the commission dismissing a complaint for lack of probable cause, because such a dismissal is not an adjudication.
*364
In
Goldberger v. Weiler
(Aug. 3, 1999), Franklin App. No. 98AP-1097, unreported,
“* * * The order that appellant seeks to appeal to the court of common pleas did not determine the rights, duties, privileges, or legal relationships of anyone. Rather, the order is simply a determination by the commission that insufficient evidence of a violation of Ohio’s real estate laws exists to justify proceeding to an adjudication, which would determine the parties’ rights, duties, privileges, or legal relationships. See Barron v. State (Dec. 2, 1980), Franklin App. No. 80AP-470, unreported (1980 Opinions 3668) (holding that an order of the Ohio Motor Vehicle Dealers Board refusing to proceed further on a complaint did not determine rights, duties, privileges, or legal relationships of any person and was therefore not issued pursuant to an adjudication).
“The commission’s determination not to proceed further with appellant’s complaint is akin to the decision of a county prosecutor not to seek an indictment based on a citizen’s report of a crime. Boieru v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1988),54 Ohio App.3d 23 , 27,560 N.E.2d 801 ; Barron, supra. In both cases, the decision not to proceed is an executive rather than an adjudicative decision, and is consequently not appealable. Boieru, supra.”
Here, as in Goldberger, the dismissal was merely an executive decision and not an adjudication from which an appeal lies.
Finally, contrary to appellant’s argument, we find no conflict between
Because we conclude that there is no right to appeal from a dismissal of a complaint before appellee, the common pleas court did not err in dismissing appellant’s appeal. Consequently, appellant’s assignment of error is overruled.
Based upon the foregoing reasons, appellant’s single assignment of error is overruled, and the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.