Earl Scott v. State of Vermont
256 A.3d 105
Vt.2021Background:
- In 2010 Scott (age 22) was charged with sexual offenses alleged to have occurred in 2003–2004; he pleaded guilty to lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and began serving a 2–5 year sentence in Jan 2012.
- While pursuing post-conviction relief (PCR), Scott learned he had been denied proper good-time credit and served past his maximum date; the State conceded in May 2016 that his plea colloquy violated Rule 11 and agreed the conviction should be vacated.
- On July 12, 2016 (with knowledge a vacatur was forthcoming), Scott signed a broad written general release in exchange for $40,000 that discharged “any and all” claims arising from his incarceration, including unknown or future claims.
- The civil division vacated Scott’s conviction and the criminal charge was later dismissed; Scott then sued under the Vermont Innocence Protection Act (VIPA) in Aug 2018 seeking damages as an exonerated person.
- The State moved for summary judgment, arguing the general release barred the VIPA claim and, alternatively, that Scott could not satisfy VIPA's requirements (actual innocence; no fabrication or perjury). The trial court granted summary judgment on the release ground and also found Scott failed the VIPA actual-innocence requirement. The Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the general release bar Scott’s VIPA claim? | Release language did not expressly cover a VIPA claim; should be read narrowly. | Release unambiguously discharged "any and all" claims, including unknown/future claims arising from the incarceration. | Release is unambiguous and bars Scott’s VIPA claim. |
| Is the release void as against public policy because the VIPA claim had not yet accrued? | Void because releasing uncontemplated future statutory claims is manifestly unjust. | Public policy favors settlements; releases of future claims are common and VIPA contemplates enforceable releases. | Public-policy doctrine does not void this release; enforcement is permitted. |
| Did the VIPA require a statute-specific written settlement/notice that the release did not provide? | §5574(d) requires a written settlement “as a result of a claim under this subchapter,” so a VIPA-specific release/notice was required. | VIPA only requires a written release when settling a VIPA claim; the general written release satisfies that requirement. | Court rejects the statute-specificity argument; the general written release complies. |
| Did Scott nonetheless meet VIPA merits (actual innocence / no fabrication or perjury)? | Scott asserts he is actually innocent (juvenile at time of conduct) and did not fabricate or perjure. | State argued Scott is not "actually innocent" and alternatively raised fabrication/perjury. | Majority did not reach fabrication/perjury; held release disposes claim (trial court also found Scott failed actual-innocence requirement). |
Key Cases Cited
- Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Mitec Elecs., Ltd., 965 A.2d 447 (recognizing broad release language can unambiguously bar unknown future claims arising from prior events)
- Investment Props., Inc. v. Lyttle, 739 A.2d 1222 (release interpretation must be narrow when the writing is ambiguous as to scope)
- Isbrandtsen v. N. Branch Corp., 556 A.2d 81 (extrinsic evidence admissible only if a writing is ambiguous)
- In re D.K., 47 A.3d 347 (age at time of offense controls juvenile jurisdiction—relevant to Scott’s asserted innocence)
- Dutch Hill Inn, Inc. v. Patten, 303 A.2d 811 (public policy standard for voiding contracts: must be "cruel or shocking" or injurious to public good)
- Chubb v. Amax Coal Co., 466 N.E.2d 369 (IL Ct. App. case discussed but deemed inapplicable on facts regarding uncontemplated future claims)