In re D.K., Juvenile
No. 11-076
Supreme Court of Vermont
March 23, 2012
2012 VT 23 | 47 A.3d 347
Present: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.
the test “shall be disclosed only to the offender and the victim,”
¶ 34. An offender‘s privacy protections are greatly diminished by this particular criminal act. Having sexually assaulted the victim and deposited his DNA without consent - an act of physical harm if not also an implicit, if not explicit, waiver of confidentiality - the offender‘s remaining privacy rights are sufficiently defined by the statute. What the victim, a private citizen, does with the information afterwards was of no concern to the Legislature and, absent legislative direction to the contrary, is no business of this Court. The law does not call on the courts to prohibit further disclosure. Because consideration of additional limits is not constitutionally required, it amounts to a policy choice and “[o]ur function is not to substitute our view of the appropriate balance for that of the Legislature.” Badgley, 2010 VT 68, ¶ 24. I would affirm, and therefore dissent.
¶ 35. I am authorized to state that Justice Burgess joins this dissent.
David F. Silver and Timothy M. Andrews (On the Brief) of Barr, Sternberg, Moss, Lawrence & Silver, P.C., Bennington, for Defendant-Appellee.
¶ 1. Johnson, J. The issue in this case is whether the State may prosecute an adult defendant for crimes alleged to have occurred when he was a juvenile between the ages of ten and fourteen years. The prosecution is late, not through any fault of the State, because the alleged victims did not come forward until defendant was eighteen
¶ 2. On appeal, the State argues that the family division erred by dismissing the more serious felony charges because: (1) a recent legislative enactment addressing what it calls a “gap” in the jurisdictional provisions of the statutes is a mere clarification demonstrating that the Legislature had always intended that adult defendants be subject to prosecution for serious crimes committed when they were juveniles; and (2) even if the new amendment does not clarify the statutes and fill the gap, there is jurisdiction in the criminal division because that division has always had jurisdiction over all serious felonies. We conclude that: (1) the Legislature‘s recent enactment did not clarify existing law but rather established entirely new law that cannot be applied retroactively to this case; therefore, to the extent that the Legislature has filled the “gap,” it has done so only prospectively; and (2) the statutory scheme applicable at the time of the offenses plainly did not allow either the family or criminal division to exercise its jurisdiction over an adult defendant accused of offenses committed as a juvenile under the age of fourteen. Accordingly, we affirm the family division‘s order dismissing all charges in this case.
¶ 3. In July 2010, the State filed an information alleging that when the eighteen-year-old defendant was between the ages of eleven and thirteen he sexually assaulted, through mouth-to-genital contact, one younger male cousin on three occasions, and that when he was between the ages of twelve and fourteen he subjected another younger male cousin to lewd and lascivious acts on four occasions. Before arraignment or a probable cause determination, the criminal division ordered the parties to submit memoranda on the question of whether it had initial jurisdiction to consider the charges. In an October 2010 decision, the criminal division removed the four lewd-and-lascivious counts to the family division and ordered that the three sexual-assault counts be redocketed in the family division as a delinquency petition.
¶ 4. Shortly thereafter, defendant filed a motion in the family division to dismiss all of the charges. The State acknowledged that the family division‘s jurisdiction was limited to juveniles under the age of eighteen, but nevertheless argued that the court should accept jurisdiction over the lewd and lascivious conduct charges and transfer the sexual assault charges to the criminal division. In February 2011, the family division issued a decision concluding that: (1) it lacked jurisdiction over the lewd and lascivious conduct charges because defendant had reached his eighteenth birthday;
and (2) for the same reason, it lacked jurisdiction to transfer the sexual assault charges to the criminal division, given the statutory requirement that such charges against juveniles be filed in the first instance in the family division.
¶ 5. The State appeals the dismissal of only the sexual assault counts, arguing first that the Legislature‘s recent clarification of the statutes solves the jurisdictional issue and demonstrates that the Legislature
¶ 6. During the 2011 legislative session, after the family division filed its decision in this case, the Legislature enacted a statute, codified as
¶ 7. Before the enactment of
¶ 8. Although “[t]he general presumption is that legislation is intended to
contrary to what the Legislature has actually done is not controlling and must be disregarded.
¶ 9. Here, the Legislature‘s attempt to clarify the law in 2011 after defendant was charged created an entirely new jurisdictional statute providing procedures for adjudicating delinquency petitions involving adult defendants where none existed before. The new statute is plainly inconsistent with the prior law and cannot be considered merely a clarification of what a previous Legislature had intended the statute to mean.
¶ 10. The State argues, however, that even if the Legislature‘s 2011 amendment cannot be considered a clarification of the law as it existed at the time the instant charges were brought, the law at that time still plainly provided jurisdiction in the criminal division to adjudicate those charges. According to the State, although the adult defendant may have been beyond the family division‘s jurisdiction, the criminal division has general jurisdiction “to try, render judgment, and pass sentence in prosecutions for felonies,”
¶ 11. None of these arguments is consistent with the statutory scheme in place at the time the charges were brought in this case, which provided the family division with exclusive original jurisdiction to adjudicate charges alleging delinquent acts committed by defendants under the age of fourteen. As a general matter, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the family division shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and dispose of . . . [a]ll juvenile proceedings filed pursuant to chapters 51, 52, and 53 of Title 33 . . . whether the matter originated in the criminal or family division of the superior court.”
concerning a child who is or who is alleged to be a delinquent child . . . under the authority of the juvenile judicial proceedings chapters, except as otherwise provided in such chapters.”
¶ 13. The juvenile proceedings act generally defines “[c]hild” to include “[a]n individual who has been alleged to have committed or has committed an act of delinquency after becoming 10 years of age and prior to becoming 18 years of age.”
¶ 14. The juvenile transfer statutes determine when a juvenile may be treated as an adult in criminal court. Delinquency proceedings may be commenced, depending on the circumstances, by the filing of a delinquency petition in the family division or by transfer from another court, including the criminal division.
family division from other courts provides that: (1) cases involving individuals who committed offenses not set forth in
¶ 15. These transfer statutes, while explicitly providing in detail when charges against juvenile offenders may or must be filed in the criminal division - depending on the offense charged and the age of the offender - notably do not provide for filing charges in the criminal division in cases where the defendant was between the ages of ten and fourteen at the time the delinquent acts were committed, even if the act is an offense listed under
grounded in the recognition that the acts were committed by a child under the age of fourteen.
¶ 16. Read together, these statutory provisions plainly and unambiguously demonstrate that the family division had exclusive original jurisdiction over all of the charges in this case - not only, as the State recognizes, the lewd and lascivious conduct counts for acts allegedly committed in part after defendant reached the age of fourteen, but also the sexual assault counts for acts allegedly committed when defendant was between the ages of eleven and thirteen. Moreover, the family division‘s exclusive original jurisdiction terminated upon defendant having reached eighteen years of age. In effect, the time period that the Legislature allowed for prosecution of the charged offenses that defendant allegedly committed as a child has expired. Indeed, the State acknowledges that the family division properly dismissed the State‘s delinquency petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
¶ 17. We find no support for the State‘s position that, even assuming the family division properly dismissed the delinquency petition under the applicable law, the criminal division retains jurisdiction in this case by virtue of its general jurisdiction over criminal offenses such as sexual assault. This position is contrary not only to the plain meaning of the applicable statutory scheme, but also the relevant case law. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 554 N.E.2d 1212, 1213 (Mass. 1990) (superseded by statute) (holding that similar statutory scheme did not allow criminal court to exercise jurisdiction over charges against juvenile who committed delinquent acts when he was twelve or thirteen years old but was not apprehended and prosecuted until he was nineteen years old); State v. Dellinger, 468 S.E.2d 218, 220-21 (N.C. 1996) (interpreting similar statutory scheme under similar circumstances and concluding that both plain meaning of statutes and legislative policy underlying those statutes gave juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction pending transfer to criminal court). As the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in Dellinger, the criminal court “cannot obtain jurisdiction by the mere passage of time nor
can the mere passage of time transform a juvenile offense into an adult felony.” Dellinger, 468 S.E.2d at 220.
¶ 18. The State argues, however, that the Legislature must have contemplated jurisdiction in the criminal division under these circumstances because, in its view, the alternative of allowing the
¶ 19. Although defendant was eighteen years old when the State brought charges against him, this case concerns delinquent acts, the most serious of which occurred when defendant was between eleven and thirteen years of age. Juvenile proceedings are aimed primarily at protecting and rehabilitating youth in trouble. See
¶ 20. Nor can it be considered absurd or irrational, in light of the relevant policy considerations, for the Legislature to have established a statutory scheme precluding the criminal prosecution of adult defendants accused of having committed delinquent acts when they were between the ages of ten and fourteen - even if that meant that they could not be prosecuted in the family division because of age-related jurisdictional limitations. While this Court construes statutes under the assumption that the Legislature did
¶ 21. Notwithstanding the statement of legislative purpose in the 2011 amendment‘s preamble, it is impossible at this juncture to know what a prior Legislature intended by not providing jurisdiction in either the family or criminal division for the State to prosecute adults who committed delinquent acts as children under the age of fourteen. It could have been an oversight or it could have been an intentional policy decision. See A Juvenile, 554 N.E.2d at 1213 (recognizing that legislation not providing for prosecution of adult defendant charged with delinquent acts committed before fourteen years of age could be unintended “gap” in statute, but concluding that “[t]he Legislature is the proper
forum in which to raise this concern“). But given the specificity of the original statutory scheme as to when the criminal or family division may exercise its jurisdiction to adjudicate charges against juveniles - depending on the offense charged and the age of the defendant at the time the offense was committed - it is just as likely that the Legislature intended not to allow criminal prosecution of adult defendants who committed delinquent acts between the ages of ten and fourteen, even if it meant that they would be beyond the family division‘s jurisdiction. See In re Coleman, 459 N.Y.S.2d 711, 715 (Fam. Ct. 1983) (dismissing delinquency petition concerning adult defendant who committed charged acts as juvenile, and noting that gap in statute not providing for prosecution of adult defendants who committed delinquent acts when under age of sixteen was either “an oversight” or “more likely a brief eleven year change in legislative policy toward prosecution of persons under sixteen charged with certain acts“).
¶ 22. In any event, we will not create jurisdiction where it did not exist to cover this perceived “gap,” which has since been addressed by the Legislature. Given the applicable law and the circumstances of this case, neither the family nor criminal division had jurisdiction to adjudicate the State‘s charges alleging that the adult defendant committed three counts of sexual assault when he was a child between the ages of eleven and thirteen. Accordingly, the family division acted properly in dismissing these charges, along with the lewd and lascivious conduct charges.
¶ 23. The dissent identifies the issue before us as “what should be done with adults who are alleged to have committed felonies when still juveniles,” post, ¶ 31, and indicates it “would much prefer” that the criminal division adjudicate this matter “rather than letting a calendar decide the outcome,” post, ¶ 42. Apparently, the dissent‘s preference is based on two past cases in which juveniles between the ages of fourteen and sixteen committed egregious crimes. As the dissent acknowledges, however, the Legislature responded to those instances of juvenile crime by amending Vermont‘s juvenile justice laws. Indeed, in this case we construe those very laws, which unequivocally demonstrate that jurisdiction does not exist in either the family or criminal division to prosecute an adult defendant for crimes committed when he was under the age of fourteen. This Court‘s role is to determine legislative intent by construing the relevant law, not to provide our opinion on what should
have committed felonies when still juveniles. That is the Legislature‘s prerogative and they have exercised it.
Affirmed.
¶ 24. Dooley, J., concurring. I concur fully in the Court‘s decision. I write only to urge the Legislature to reconsider a decision made in the recent judicial branch restructuring legislation. In making this plea, I am trying to avoid situations where the wording of legislation fails to implement legislative intent such that important policy objectives cannot be reached. It is hard to read our decision in this case without concluding that we have invented a case processing machine so complicated that we cannot easily control its operating rules.
¶ 25. This case is fundamentally about what consequences should result when a young juvenile commits a serious crime but is not charged until he or she becomes an adult. We must hold that the answer is “no consequences” under the applicable statutory language, but that conclusion is reached only through pages of statutory analysis involving two statutory schemes and two trial court decisions reached independently by two different divisions of the superior court. I understand from the Legislature‘s statement of purpose accompanying the corrective legislation that it never intended this result:
However, the general assembly never intended the juvenile procedures statutes to be used to permit a person who commits a crime to escape the consequences of that behavior simply by turning 18 before the state has filed charges against the person.
2011, No. 16, § 1. In my opinion, this deviation between legislative language and legislative intent occurred because we have a very complicated system of transferring cases between courts and, despite the best intentions, it is possible that some cases, perversely, will not have a home that comfortably or completely fits the circumstances of the case. In common jargon, these cases fall between the cracks.
¶ 26. Prior to restructuring, juvenile delinquency cases were adjudicated in family court, and criminal cases were adjudicated in district court. If the circumstances of the case indicated that it should not be adjudicated in the court in which it was filed, the case and its paper file had to be sent from the wrong court to the
right court, the necessary consequence of having separate first instance courts. Stated simplistically, the overall question was whether the circumstances warranted a juvenile rehabilitation disposition that continued only to adulthood in a confidential proceeding or, alternatively, warranted a criminal sentence in an open proceeding. Over time, the relevant circumstances became more and more complicated.
¶ 27. Restructuring created the opportunity to eliminate some of the complication. Since the family court and district court were merged into the superior court, it became possible to avoid transferring cases between courts and to get to the heart of the matter in one proceeding. Unfortunately, that did not happen in cases like this one because the jurisdictional walls between the components of the new superior court continued and cases must, accordingly, be transferred between divisions of the superior court by the same formal process that existed in the past. Cases continue to fall through the cracks just as they did before.
¶ 28. Thus, we have a situation where in many counties we have one court, with one judge and a unified staff, but the judge has to transfer the case to him or herself in order to match the disposition or sentence
¶ 29. We can solve this problem by allowing a case to be filed in the criminal or family division, but then treating the filing point as a doorway into a proceeding that will evaluate the circumstances and determine how best to handle it with all relevant options available. In other words, we could have judges wearing no hats with the ability to conduct the proceeding as if he or she was wearing all possible hats. In viewing case processing this way, we are less likely to create cracks that will frustrate legislative intent and will be able to deal with cases that cross current jurisdictional boundaries as one case.
¶ 30. I urge the Legislature to review the jurisdictional walls between the components of the superior court and remove them
for cases like this, in order to allow the most expeditious route to a just result.
¶ 31. Skoglund, J., dissenting. This case asks what should be done with adults who are alleged to have committed felonies when still juveniles. The majority believes the answer is “nothing.” While I agree that the family division lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the charges of lewd and lascivious conduct and of sexual assault, I cannot find in the statutes any intent to allow defendants that have committed serious felonies to avoid any consequences by the mere fact that they were under fourteen years of age when they did so. I would hold that a case could be brought in the criminal division of the superior court, to which the Legislature has granted jurisdiction “to try, render judgment, and pass sentence in prosecutions for felonies and misdemeanors.”
¶ 32. Thirty years ago Vermont awoke to a new realization of a child‘s capacity for depravity and violence. Wade Willis, age sixteen, beat his pregnant girlfriend in the head with a baseball bat and left her for dead. Later that day he returned, realized she was still alive, and used a shovel to finish what he started. Then he buried her. State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 464, 494 A.2d 108, 110 (1985)State v. Hamlin, 146 Vt. 97, 99-100, 499 A.2d 45, 47-48 (1985). The Age of Innocence, whether the phrase is applied to the age of the youths or the attitude of the public, was irremediably altered by these events of these two days in May 1981.
¶ 33. Louis Hamlin‘s fifteen-year-old companion, who had been an equal participant in the vicious crime and at one point even claimed responsibility for the fatal stabbing, could not be charged in the criminal courts because he was under the age of sixteen. In re Hamlin, 155 Vt. 98, 99-100, 582 A.2d 129, 130 (1990). Juvenile delinquency proceedings were instituted
¶ 34. The Legislature responded, calling a special session in July 1981 to significantly change Vermont‘s juvenile justice laws. The
law prior to 1981 required any court entertaining a criminal proceeding involving a defendant under the age of sixteen to transfer the matter to juvenile court.
¶ 35. Then, in 1988, fourteen-year-old Steven Buelow raped and murdered his seven-year-old cousin. He was charged in criminal court and moved to have his case transferred to juvenile court pursuant to the statutes then in place,
¶ 36. I agree that the statutes governing delinquency proceedings answer the question of whether the family division had jurisdiction to adjudicate this matter. Under
children and that defendant was older than eighteen. It also correctly noted it could not transfer jurisdiction that it did not possess to the criminal division. I also agree with the majority that the newly enacted
¶ 37. While
¶ 38. When creating the juvenile justice system, the Legislature gave special attention to eleven (now twelve) serious felonies, one of which is sexual assault.
¶ 39. This view runs counter to the majority‘s assumption that it is the age of the perpetrator at the time of the offense that exclusively determines jurisdiction. This view is supported by provisions of
to transfer to the family division any case filed against a defendant under the age of sixteen at the time of the offense, unless it is one of the offenses specified in
¶ 40. Reading the entire statutory scheme involving criminal jurisdiction in pari materia to ascertain the Legislature‘s intent, In re Willey, 2010 VT 93, ¶ 11, 189 Vt. 536, 14 A.3d 954, there is no indication that the Legislature intended to allow adult defendants to completely avoid the results of their actions as a juvenile. Chapter 52 of Title 33 is a comprehensive act governing juvenile delinquency proceedings with the overarching goal of protecting children who are still growing and maturing from the consequences of their actions. See In re G.T., 170 Vt. 507, 532, 758 A.2d 301, 318 (2000) (“[T]he focus of delinquency proceedings in general . . . is on protecting children . . . .” (Johnson, J., dissenting)); In re P.M., 156 Vt. 303, 310, 592 A.2d 862, 865 (1991) (“We recognize that the purpose of Vermont‘s juvenile provisions is not to punish juvenile offenders, but to . . . provide treatment consistent with the public interest for children who have committed delinquent acts.“); see also
consequences of criminal behavior and to provide supervision, care, and rehabilitation“).
¶ 41. However, the protections of the juvenile justice system are designed for children, not adults. The majority emphasizes the young age of the defendant when the acts alleged were committed and discusses the goal of juvenile proceedings to protect and rehabilitate youth in trouble. It posits that the policy behind the juvenile justice system takes into account that a child who commits a felony offense is still a child and “his culpability must be viewed in light of his age.” Ante, ¶ 19. I agree, especially in a case where the allegation is sexual assault by a thirteen-year-old. However, there is nothing to preclude a defendant charged with committing a sexual assault when he was thirteen from moving to dismiss a charge against him, arguing, for example, that, due to his tender years, the State will be unable to prove the requisite intent to satisfy the elements of the offense. See Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 172 Vt. 204, 215, 777 A.2d 151, 159 (2001) (explaining that it is “improper to [automatically] infer an intent to injure in cases where a minor sexually abuses another minor“). Questions that surround juvenile adjudications - brain development, emotional maturity, and impulse control - do not disappear when raised by a defendant charged with an act committed while a child. Moreover, failing to allow a prosecution to go forward removes any ability of the State to offer rehabilitative services to a man who, as a child, allegedly committed a felonious act of sexual assault, leaving him untreated.
¶ 42. Further support for this position is found in the statutes governing youthful offenders.
tion requires that former children who committed very serious felonies be accountable in a court of law. I would much prefer a court evaluate legislatively designated criminal behavior and impose any necessary rehabilitative restrictions rather than letting a calendar decide the outcome.
¶ 43. While the provisions of newly enacted
¶ 44. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Reiber joins this dissent.
Notes
(A) The maturity of the defendant as determined by consideration of his or her age; home; environment; emotional, psychological, and
physical maturity; and relationship with and adjustment to school and the community.(B) The extent and nature of the defendant‘s prior criminal record and record of delinquency.
(C) The nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the defendant‘s response to them.
(D) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner.
(E) The nature of any personal injuries resulting from or intended to be caused by the alleged act.
(F) Whether the protection of the community would be best served by transferring jurisdiction from the family division to the criminal division of the superior court.
In making its determination as required under subsection (c) of this section, the court may consider, among other matters:
(1) The maturity of the child as determined by consideration of his or her age, home, environment; emotional, psychological and physical maturity; and relationship with and adjustment to school and the community.
(2) The extent and nature of the child‘s prior record of delinquency.
(3) The nature of past treatment efforts and the nature of the child‘s response to them.
(4) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated, or willful manner.
(5) The nature of any personal injuries resulting from or intended to be caused by the alleged act.
(6) The prospects for rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities available through juvenile proceedings.(7) Whether the protection of the community would be best served by transferring jurisdiction from the juvenile court to the criminal division of the superior court.