Earl E. Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 5657
| 11th Cir. | 2015Background
- This is an Engle-progeny wrongful-death suit: Earl Graham (personal representative) sued R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris alleging Faye Graham died from lung cancer caused by addiction to defendants’ cigarettes; claims at issue: strict liability and negligence.
- The original Engle class-action (certified, tried in Phase I on common issues, jury found in favor of class) was later decertified by the Florida Supreme Court, which held Phase I findings would have res judicata effect in later individual suits (Engle III).
- Florida courts diverged over the scope/effect of the Phase I findings (issue v. claim preclusion, and how to prove causation in progeny trials); Douglas (Fla. 2013) held the findings operate as claim preclusion for common “conduct elements” (duty, breach, general causation) and that progeny plaintiffs must prove class membership, individual causation, and damages.
- In Graham’s federal trial the district court instructed the jury to accept the Engle findings on negligence and defectiveness and to decide only whether smoking each defendant’s cigarettes was a legal cause of death; jury returned verdict for Graham and apportioned fault.
- Defendants renewed Rule 50(b) JMOL arguing federal law preempts these tort claims because the Engle-derived duty effectively bans cigarettes (conflicts with Congress’s long-standing federal objective to regulate but not prohibit cigarette sales); the district court denied JMOL and the appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Engle‑progeny strict‑liability and negligence claims are preempted by federal law (obstacle preemption) | Graham: no preemption; Engle findings supply state‑law duties and Douglas/Douglas-derived procedure is valid under Florida law and due process | Reynolds/Philip Morris: Engle findings (as applied) impose a duty that treats every cigarette sale as defective/negligent, which frustrates Congress’s purpose to regulate but not ban cigarettes, so federal law preempts | Court held claims are preempted: the Engle‑based duties (as interpreted by Florida courts) effectively prohibit cigarette sales and therefore stand as an obstacle to Congress’s objective to allow legal cigarette sales |
| Scope of Phase I findings required to prevail in progeny suits | Graham: District Court instruction (accept Phase I findings on negligence/defectiveness) suffices; plaintiff need only prove membership, individual causation, damages | Defendants: Phase I findings are overbroad and brand‑agnostic; applying them offensively to relieve plaintiffs of proving conduct elements is unconstitutional and conflicts with federal objectives | Court concluded the Florida construction (claim‑preclusion effect of broad, brandless Phase I findings plus Douglas's individual‑causation rule) produces a duty that every cigarette sale breached—an outcome preempted by federal law |
| Whether preemption analysis should account for defendants’ ability to pay damages (i.e., tort as a “cost of doing business”) | Graham: damages remedy means no practical conflict with federal objectives; presumption against preemption weighs against preemption | Defendants: even if defendants can pay, the legal effect is equivalent to banning cigarettes; preemption does not depend on economic feasibility | Court followed precedent (Geier) and rejected reliance on compliance/cost considerations; state tort duties can be preemptive if they stand as an obstacle |
| Whether saving clauses or absence of express preemption prevents implied preemption | Graham: lack of express preemption and statutory saving provisions shield the claims | Defendants: ordinary conflict/obstacle preemption can exist despite absence of express preemption or saving clauses | Court held absence of express preemption and saving clauses does not bar obstacle preemption; evaluated congressional intent and regulatory scheme and found conflict |
Key Cases Cited
- Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Florida Supreme Court decertified class but held Phase I findings have res judicata effect in progeny suits)
- Phillip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (held Phase I findings operate as claim preclusion for common conduct elements and set framework for individual causation)
- Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013) (interpreted Douglas; limited Phase I findings to common issues and rejected due process challenge)
- Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (earlier Eleventh Circuit opinion addressing scope of Phase I findings and burden on progeny plaintiffs)
- FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (Supreme Court concluded congressional statutes collectively presupposed continued sale of cigarettes and limited FDA authority)
- Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000) (Supreme Court discussed obstacle preemption and that compliance/cost considerations are not dispositive)
- Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality) (discussed preemption of state common‑law duties and treated common law as state law for preemption analysis)
- Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009) (addressed presumption against preemption in state‑law tort suits)
Disposition: Judgment reversed; Engle‑progeny strict‑liability and negligence claims premised on the Phase I findings (as interpreted by Florida courts) are preempted by federal law.