650 F. App'x 811
3rd Cir.2016Background
- E & R Enterprise LLC bought property in Rehoboth Beach intending to build a house and an in-ground pool and submitted a building-permit application on Sept. 15, 2014.
- Four days later the City adopted a proposed moratorium on unenclosed swimming-pool permits in the relevant zoning district; on Oct. 14 the City orally told E & R its permit was denied and would not accept additional information.
- City officials held hearings and on Nov. 17 informed E & R they would take no further action on the moratorium or the permit application; E & R then sued in Delaware Court of Chancery and later amended to assert federal and state claims against the City and officials.
- Defendants removed to federal court; they moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (ripeness) and failure to state a claim. The District Court dismissed most federal claims as unripe for failure to appeal to the Board of Adjustment (BOA), dismissed one federal substantive-due-process claim on the merits, remanded an equitable-estoppel claim to state court, and denied leave to amend.
- The Third Circuit reviewed de novo, concluded all federal claims were unripe because E & R did not seek a final administrative decision from the BOA, vacated and remanded with instructions that the case be sent back to state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ripeness of § 1983 procedural due process and equal protection claims | E & R argued the permit denial was final and not appealable to BOA because City officials "hijacked" the process and rendered a non-appealable decision | Defendants argued E & R failed to obtain a final administrative decision by not appealing to the BOA, so federal claims are unripe | Court held claims unripe; BOA appeal was required and E & R’s factual allegations did not show the denial was unappealable |
| Ripeness of substantive due process claim under § 1983 | E & R claimed ‘‘shock the conscience’’ conduct by City in delaying/denying the permit; said conduct made claim ripe despite lack of BOA appeal | Defendants urged finality rule applies and BOA review is necessary before federal suit | Court held substantive due process claim also unripe; Blanche Road exception inapplicable where claim rests on permit denial |
| Exception for harassment or independent injury (Blanche Road/County Concrete) | E & R suggested City’s conduct created an independent, egregious injury making judicial review ripe without BOA appeal | Defendants responded that alleged misconduct was part of the permit-denial process and not the kind of distinct harassment that excused finality | Court held exception did not apply; alleged conduct did not resemble the extraordinary harassment in Blanche Road/County Concrete |
| Leave to amend after dismissal for lack of jurisdiction | E & R sought leave to amend to cure deficiencies | Defendants argued amendment would be futile because ripeness/jurisdictional bar remained | Court held denying leave was not an abuse of discretion but instructed remand to state court because federal jurisdiction was lacking |
Key Cases Cited
- Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (ripeness/finality rule for land-use § 1983 claims)
- Lauderbaugh v. Hopewell Twp., 319 F.3d 568 (3d Cir. rule applying Williamson County to zoning cases)
- Taylor Inv., Ltd. v. Upper Darby Twp., 983 F.2d 1285 (finality rule bars premature procedural due process claims)
- Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253 (limited exception where harassment made review ripe)
- County Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159 (application/clarification of Blanche Road exception)
- Sameric Corp. of Del. v. Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582 (declining Blanche Road exception where claims rest on permit denial)
- Acierno v. Mitchell, 6 F.3d 970 (BOA has final authority to interpret zoning in permit-denial context)
- Armstrong World Indus. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405 (remand required where federal court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Bromwell v. Michigan Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 208 (§ 1447(c) remand instruction where removal improper)