E.A.M. v. A.M.D., III
173 A.3d 313
| Pa. Super. Ct. | 2017Background
- April 1, 2015: A.M.D. III (then 17) and M.M. (16) had a sexual encounter in/near M.M.’s car; M.M. testified she did not consent and described coerced oral sex and other contact.
- State police filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging conduct that would be indecent assault if committed by an adult; the juvenile court found sex occurred but declined to adjudicate delinquency because lack of consent had not been sufficiently communicated for proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
- January 27, 2016: M.M.’s mother filed a petition under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act (PVSVIA) seeking a civil protection order for M.M.
- Trial court granted a temporary order and, after an evidentiary hearing, entered a three‑year final no‑contact protection order finding M.M. a victim of sexual violence and that she faced a continued risk of harm from Appellant due to his recurrent presence at school events.
- Appellant appealed asserting (1) the court applied the wrong standard (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt), (2) insufficient evidence of continued risk/harm, and (3) (waived) bad faith based on post‑order social media behavior.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PVSVIA requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent committed the underlying crime before finding a victim | PVSVIA petitioner need only assert victim status and prove risk by preponderance; criminal conviction not required | Appellant: statutory phrase "conduct constituting a crime" means criminal adjudication/proof beyond a reasonable doubt is prerequisite to PVSVIA relief | Court: Rejected Appellant; PVSVIA is civil, not criminal; no criminal conviction or beyond‑reasonable‑doubt finding required; petitioner need only assert victim status and meet civil preponderance standard |
| Whether evidence supported finding of continued risk of harm by preponderance | M.M. and mother: Appellant’s repeated attendance at school events and school endorsement of his presence caused fear and emotional harm, creating continued risk | Appellant: merely appearing at events without interacting does not show harm or risk; protections not meant for social encounters | Court: Found record supports preponderance finding—Appellant’s presence and school’s accommodation produced apprehension and emotional harm; affirmed order |
| Whether trial court should have considered post‑order social media attempt by M.M. (bad faith) | Appellant argued this showed bad faith pursuit of protection order | Petitioner did not present or litigate this before trial court | Court: Issue waived — not raised below; not in certified record; no relief |
Key Cases Cited
- Boykin v. Brown, 868 A.2d 1264 (Pa. Super. 2005) (PFA court may not base civil protection determination on whether criminal charges were filed)
- Ferko–Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917 (Pa. Super. 2013) (standard of review for PFA/PVSVIA orders: abuse of discretion or error of law)
- Depp v. Holland, 636 A.2d 204 (Pa. Super. 1994) (abuse of discretion explained)
- Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. 1993) (PFA does not determine criminal culpability)
- Commonwealth v. Boyd, 679 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 1996) (appellate courts cannot consider matters not in the certified record)
- Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 2009) (issues not raised below cannot be preserved merely by inclusion in Rule 1925(b))
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (definition and explanation of preponderance standard)