E.A.M. v. A.M.D., III
515 WDA 2016
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Sep 27, 2017Background
- April 1, 2015: Appellant (17) and M.M. (16) engaged in a sexual encounter in a car and on the roadside; M.M. testified it was nonconsensual (oral sex, ejaculation in her mouth, subsequent manual contact).
- Juvenile delinquency petition alleging conduct equivalent to indecent assault was filed; juvenile court found sex occurred and was nonconsensual but dismissed the petition because lack of communicated nonconsent was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Jan 27, 2016: Petitioner (M.M.’s mother) filed for a protection order under the PVSVIA on behalf of M.M., alleging Appellant continued to appear at school events and made M.M. feel unsafe; school reportedly allowed his presence.
- Trial court issued a temporary order and, after an evidentiary hearing, entered a three‑year final PVSVIA protection order prohibiting all contact.
- Appellant appealed, arguing (1) wrong standard of proof required (must be beyond a reasonable doubt), (2) no evidence of continued risk or harm, and (3) bad faith by petitioner (waived).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PVSVIA requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that underlying conduct was a crime | Petitioner asserted M.M. was a victim of sexual violence and proved risk by preponderance | Appellant argued PVSVIA’s reference to “conduct constituting a crime” requires criminal conviction or proof beyond a reasonable doubt | Court held PVSVIA does not require criminal conviction or proof beyond a reasonable doubt; civil standard applies and mere credible assertion of victim status suffices for initial showing |
| Whether petitioner proved continued risk of harm by preponderance of evidence | Petitioner presented M.M.’s testimony about Appellant’s appearances at school events and school endorsement of his presence causing fear | Appellant argued attendance at events without direct contact does not show harm or continued risk | Court held testimony and school’s accommodation supported a finding by preponderance that M.M. faced continued emotional/psychological harm and risk |
| Whether court improperly relied on juvenile proceeding/DA decision | Petitioner relied on evidence and court credibility findings independent of juvenile dismissal | Appellant argued the juvenile court’s dismissal (no adjudication) negates PVSVIA relief | Court held juvenile dismissal/prosecutorial declination irrelevant to civil PVSVIA determination; Boykin precedent supports separation |
| Waiver of post‑order conduct as evidence of bad faith | Petitioner did not rely on post‑order social media activity at trial | Appellant pointed to alleged attempt by M.M. to friend his mother as evidence of bad faith | Court found this claim waived for failure to raise below and not in certified record |
Key Cases Cited
- Boykin v. Brown, 868 A.2d 1264 (Pa. Super. 2005) (PFA court may not deny relief because criminal charges were not filed; civil remedy separate from criminal prosecution)
- Snyder v. Snyder, 629 A.2d 977 (Pa. Super. 1993) (Protection from Abuse Act does not determine criminal culpability)
- Ferko–Fox v. Fox, 68 A.3d 917 (Pa. Super. 2013) (standard of review for PFA/PVSVIA orders is abuse of discretion or error of law)
- Depp v. Holland, 636 A.2d 204 (Pa. Super. 1994) (definition of abuse of discretion in family/civil protection contexts)
- Boyd, 679 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 1996) (appellate court cannot consider matters not in certified record)
- Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253 (Pa. 2009) (issues not raised below generally cannot be raised on appeal)
- Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410 (Pa. 2017) (defines preponderance of the evidence as more likely than not standard)