Dzikowski v. State, 436 Md. 430

Background

On Jan. 6, 2008, Dzikowski pushed an intoxicated man (Ramirez‑Gavarete); another passenger later punched the victim, who was left in the roadway and was subsequently killed by a passing car.
State indicted Dzikowski using the statutory short‑form for reckless endangerment (CL § 3‑206(d)(2)); the short form did not identify specific conduct.
Dzikowski timely demanded a bill of particulars under Maryland Rule 4‑241 (and CL § 3‑206(d)(5)), asking for the conduct and facts supporting the reckless endangerment charge.
The State responded by directing Dzikowski to its discovery file rather than stating, from the State’s perspective, which specific facts or acts supported the charge.
At trial the court allowed the State to proceed on a theory that the defendant’s “timed push” toward a slowly moving car constituted reckless endangerment; the jury convicted on that count. Trial court had earlier denied the bill exceptions; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. This Court granted certiorari.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Dzikowski)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether a bill of particulars requirement tied to a short‑form indictment is satisfied by directing defendant to discovery	The State’s referral to discovery is insufficient; statute/Rule require the State to specify the factual basis of the charge so defendant can prepare and avoid unfair surprise	Discovery (including open‑file) apprises defendant of facts; forcing particulars would compel disclosure of prosecutorial theory	The State’s referral to discovery was insufficient; bill of particulars must state, from the State’s perspective, the facts supporting the charge
Whether requiring particulars would force the State to disclose its legal theory	Dzikowski sought facts, not legal theory; particulars distinguish factual bases from theories	The State argued particulars would reveal its theory and strategic choices	Court: Bill must give factual particulars but need not force election of legal theory; Hadder does not bar factual particulars provided here
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in overruling exceptions to the State’s bill answers	Overruling exceptions abused discretion because answers were non‑responsive and deprived defense of required notice	State argued no prejudice because discovery and trial testimony gave necessary facts; prosecutors can pursue any theory supported by evidence	Court: Trial court abused its discretion; State violated CL § 3‑206(d)(5) by failing to particularize
Whether any error was harmless	Dzikowski argued he was prejudiced and surprised, affecting trial strategy	State argued discovery and cross‑examination mitigated any prejudice	Court: Error not harmless under Dorsey; cannot say beyond reasonable doubt that referral to discovery did not influence verdict; reversal ordered

Key Cases Cited

Hadder v. State, 238 Md. 341 (Md. 1965) (bill of particulars may not be used to force State to state its theory of case)
Spector v. State, 289 Md. 407 (Md. 1981) (particulars and discovery together may justify denial of further particulars where defendants were apprised of duties and evidence)
Polisher v. State, 11 Md. App. 555 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971) (bill of particulars specifies facts of the offense, not all evidence)
Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638 (Md. 1976) (harmless‑error standard in criminal appeals — reversal unless court is confident beyond a reasonable doubt error did not influence verdict)
Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155 (Md. 1981) (charging document must both characterize the crime and describe specific conduct charged)
Pearlman v. State, 232 Md. 251 (Md. 1963) (short form indictments must be supplemented by particulars to protect defendant)
Jones v. State, 303 Md. 323 (Md. 1985) (elements may be implied in short form; means of commission available via bill of particulars)
McMorris v. State, 277 Md. 62 (Md. 1976) (bill of particulars guards against surprise and helps defendant prepare defense)