Dycus v. Dycus, 949 N.W.2d 357

Plaintiff Debra Dycus sued for dissolution, alleging the marriage was irretrievably broken; there are four adult children and no minor children.
Michael Dycus filed a motion to dismiss and pleaded affirmative defenses asserting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-347(3)/§ 42-361 (no-fault divorce) is unconstitutional (procedural due process, special legislation, other claims) and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
The court held hearings on temporary relief, issued temporary alimony and mutual restraining orders, compelled discovery (ordering Michael to vacate the home so Debra could retrieve documents), and awarded temporary attorney fees.
Michael did not attend the final hearing (he was represented by counsel); the court found the marriage irretrievably broken and entered a decree of dissolution.
The trial court found the no-fault statute constitutional, awarded Debra $4,000 in attorney fees (from claimed $8,216.81), and Michael appealed, primarily arguing the statute is facially unconstitutional and challenging the fee award.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Debra)	Defendant's Argument (Michael)	Held
1. Motion to dismiss / subject-matter jurisdiction	Statute is valid; court has jurisdiction to adjudicate dissolution	Court lacked jurisdiction because the dissolution statute is facially unconstitutional	Trial court did not err; statute is constitutional and court had jurisdiction
2. Procedural due process challenge to no-fault statute	No-fault scheme provides notice, hearing, and a factual finding on irretrievable breakdown	No-fault deprives defendants of procedural due process—decree depends only on plaintiff’s will and is ministerial	Rejected; Nebraska statutes provide notice, opportunity to be heard, and courts make a factual determination; no procedural due process violation
3. Claim that statute is special legislation (Neb. Const. art. III, § 18)	Statute is general in application, not a grant of divorce to specific persons	Statute effectively "grants divorces" to plaintiffs, violating prohibition on special laws	Rejected; prohibition targets special legislative grants to specific persons; a general no-fault scheme is not such a law
4. Award of attorney fees	Fees supported by billing affidavit; award appropriate under statutory/familiar standards	Fees unreasonable given the nature of the case and Michael’s view that much litigation was unnecessary	Affirmed; trial court’s award ($4,000) was supported by the record and not an abuse of discretion

Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015) (recognition of right to marry and discussion of intimate choices and personal identity)
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (federal recognition of marital status issues under Due Process/Equal Protection)
Buchholz v. Buchholz, 197 Neb. 180 (Neb. 1976) (Nebraska precedent that marriage is a personal relationship subject to state law and no-fault statutes do not create a vested property interest)
Else v. Else, 219 Neb. 878 (Neb. 1985) (discussing adoption of irretrievable breakdown/no-fault grounds)
Pankoe v. Pankoe, 222 A.3d 443 (Pa. Super. 2019) (rejecting argument that no-fault divorce reduces finding of irretrievable breakdown to a ministerial act)
Garza v. Garza, 288 Neb. 213 (Neb. 2014) (factors trial courts should consider when awarding attorney fees in dissolution actions)