937 F.3d 654
6th Cir.2019Background
- Dwight Bullard pleaded guilty (2014) to distributing heroin and being a felon in possession of a firearm; officers seized >140 grams of heroin and a .40 Glock.
- Plea agreement acknowledged Bullard "may be classified as a career offender"; prior convictions included a 2003 Arizona attempted-sale conviction (Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3408) and a 2013 Ohio sale conviction.
- District court designated Bullard a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines, producing a Guidelines range of 292–365 months; court varied downward and sentenced him to 140 months.
- Bullard waived most appellate rights but reserved the right to appeal a career-offender determination; he did not pursue that issue on direct appeal and instead filed a § 2255 petition challenging the career-offender classification and alleging ineffective assistance for failure to object.
- The district court denied the § 2255 petition; the Sixth Circuit granted a COA limited to the Arizona-conviction issues and reviewed de novo whether the prior conviction is a Guidelines predicate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an attempted-sale conviction (Arizona) qualifies as a "controlled substance offense" under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 | Bullard: Attempt crimes are not covered and thus Arizona attempt conviction cannot be a predicate. | Government: At the time, circuit precedent supported treating attempt/offers as qualifying. | Court: Attempt crimes do not qualify now (Havis) but Bullard cannot raise pure Guidelines misapplication on collateral review; ineffective-assistance claim on this ground fails because counsel reasonably relied on then-controlling precedent. |
| Whether an Arizona statute that criminalizes substances not controlled federally (benzylfentanyl, thenylfentanyl) is overbroad for Guidelines purposes | Bullard: Arizona covers drugs not federally controlled, so statute is overbroad and not a qualifying predicate. | Government: Sixth Circuit precedent supports that state-only controlled substances can qualify; statute may be divisible by drug type (Bullard pleaded to cocaine). | Court: Circuit law was unsettled at the time; counsel's failure to object was not deficient or prejudicial under Strickland; claim fails. |
| Whether a misapplication of the advisory Guidelines (career-offender designation) is cognizable in a § 2255 collateral attack | Bullard: He seeks collateral relief because Havis now shows the designation was erroneous. | Government: Misapplication of advisory Guidelines is not cognizable on § 2255 unless extraordinary miscarriage of justice. | Court: Such non-constitutional Guidelines challenges are not cognizable on § 2255; Havis provides no collateral relief. |
| Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the career-offender designation on direct appeal | Bullard: Appellate counsel should have appealed the enhancement. | Government: Plain-error standard applies; no binding precedent would have made an appeal successful. | Court: Appellate counsel was not deficient; plain-error relief unavailable given lack of clear precedent; Strickland request denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (Guidelines definition of "controlled substance offense" excludes attempt crimes)
- Snider v. United States, 908 F.3d 183 (6th Cir. 2018) (non-constitutional challenges to advisory Guidelines ranges are not cognizable on § 2255)
- United States v. Foote, 784 F.3d 931 (4th Cir. 2015) (advisory-Guidelines misapplication generally not remediable on collateral review)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test)
- United States v. Evans, 699 F.3d 858 (6th Cir. 2012) (earlier Sixth Circuit precedent treating offers/attempts to sell as qualifying controlled-substance offenses)
- Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (Guidelines are advisory)
- United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979) (lawfulness of sentence not necessarily affected by Guidelines calculation)
- Spencer v. United States, 773 F.3d 1132 (11th Cir. 2014) (§ 2255 collateral-review principles for sentence-enhancement claims)
