917 F.3d 895
6th Cir.2019Background
- Duryane Chaney pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and possession with intent to distribute cocaine; the government sought an ACCA enhancement based on three prior convictions (one serious drug offense and two robberies), producing a 15-year mandatory minimum under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
- One predicate was a 1981 Michigan conviction for attempted unarmed robbery under Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.530 (1981), which criminalized theft "by force and violence, or by assault or putting in fear."
- At sentencing the government relied on circuit precedent invoking the ACCA residual clause (and the district court also referenced the elements clause in-speech), and the court applied the ACCA enhancement.
- After Johnson v. United States (2015) (Johnson II) invalidated the ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague, Chaney filed a § 2255 motion arguing his Michigan attempted unarmed robbery no longer qualified as an ACCA "violent felony."
- The district court denied relief, holding the Michigan statute (including attempt) categorically satisfies the ACCA elements clause because Michigan "putting in fear" and "force and violence" require threatened or actual violent physical force.
- On appeal the government contested procedural aspects (characterizing the claim as Johnson I force-interpretation and arguing procedural default) but forfeited some defenses; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding the conviction qualifies under the elements clause, and that attempt is encompassed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Chaney may bring a Johnson II § 2255 attack when the sentencing record could have relied on the residual clause | Chaney: yes — the sentencing court might have relied on the residual clause so Johnson II is available in a first § 2255 | Government: the claim actually depends on Johnson I (force definition) and is procedurally improper as brought | Court: Chaney may bring the Johnson II-based collateral attack because the record suggests the district court might have relied on the residual clause |
| Whether Chaney procedurally defaulted by not challenging the elements clause at sentencing | Chaney: no meaningful way to challenge elements clause when residual clause was viable at sentencing | Government: Chaney failed to raise the elements-clause argument on direct review, so claim is defaulted | Court: Government forfeited this defense by not raising it below; Chaney not barred by procedural default |
| Whether Michigan (1981) unarmed robbery (including “putting in fear” and “force and violence”) categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA elements clause | Chaney: statute can reach non-violent or de minimis force, so it does not categorically require the Johnson I definition of "physical force" | Government: Michigan robbery tracks common-law robbery and requires threatened or actual violent physical force, satisfying the elements clause | Court: Holds statute (and its alternatives) requires threatened or actual violent force and thus is a categorical ACCA violent felony |
| Whether attempted unarmed robbery (Michigan, 1981) counts under the elements clause | Chaney: Michigan attempt must be the generic attempt and could fail to match the ACCA "attempted use" language | Government: Michigan attempt law requires intent and an overt act toward completion; attempt covers the same force element | Court: Michigan attempt law satisfies attempt and the force element is identical; attempted unarmed robbery qualifies under the elements clause |
Key Cases Cited
- Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (defines "physical force" as "violent force")
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (invalidated ACCA residual clause as unconstitutionally vague)
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (common-law robbery force suffices for ACCA elements clause)
- Raines v. United States, 898 F.3d 680 (6th Cir. 2018) (first § 2255 movant may rely on Johnson II when sentencing might have rested on residual clause)
- United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054 (6th Cir. 2014) (state "putting in fear" language can require fear of bodily injury and satisfy elements clause)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach forbids reliance on fanciful or imaginative offense applications)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990) (discusses ACCA predicate offenses and the move from enumerated robbery to a broader violent-felony definition)