Durant v. District of Columbia Government
875 F.3d 685
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Earnest Durant, Jr., a longtime D.C. Department of Corrections investigator, sued the District under Title VII for retaliation and hostile work environment, based on prior participation in a 1990s class sexual-harassment suit and subsequent workplace actions.
- Key contested events: June–August 2007 administrative leave and reassignment; April 2008 Letter of Admonition; other alleged adverse acts in 2009–2010 (vehicle denial, isolation, suspension of arrest authority); notification of position elimination and termination effective July 2, 2010 as part of a District-wide RIF.
- Durant filed an EEOC charge dated August 12, 2008 and later correspondence in 2010; DOJ issued a right-to-sue notice and Durant filed suit January 6, 2010. He later filed an additional EEOC submission in March 2010.
- The District moved for summary judgment after discovery closed; the district court granted judgment for the District on all claims. Durant appealed pro se; the court appointed amicus curiae to brief arguments in support of Durant.
- On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed: (1) pre-October 2007 retaliation claims were time-barred for lack of a timely EEOC/D.C. OHR charge; (2) most post-October 2007 actions were not materially adverse; (3) termination (RIF) was materially adverse but supported by a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason and not shown to be pretextual; (4) hostile work environment claim failed for lack of severe or pervasive conduct. The court denied Durant’s request to reopen discovery.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of claims for actions before Oct 2007 | Durant argued those retaliatory acts are part of his Title VII claim and should not be dismissed | District argued Durant failed to file an EEOC/D.C. OHR charge within 180/300 days, so claims are time-barred | Affirmed: pre-Oct 2007 claims time-barred—no evidence of timely charge |
| Burden on summary judgment (who must produce evidence) | Durant/amicus argued district must prove exhaustion defense and court improperly required Durant to present evidence | District pointed to absence of evidence that a timely charge was filed and relied on Celotex/Grimes framework | Affirmed: defendant may discharge burden by pointing to absence of evidence; plaintiff failed to present affirmative evidence |
| Whether post-Oct 2007 acts were materially adverse | Durant argued admonition, vehicle denial, suspension of arrest authority, isolation, and termination were adverse and retaliatory | District argued most actions were not materially adverse and termination was due to legitimate RIF | Affirmed in part: only termination was materially adverse; other acts not materially adverse or lacked evidentiary support |
| Whether termination was pretext for retaliation | Durant relied on temporal proximity and other circumstantial evidence to infer pretext | District relied on sworn RIF justification and evidence showing position eliminated for budgetary reasons; Durant admitted RIF separation in record | Affirmed: termination was RIF, legitimate nonretaliatory reason shown; Durant offered no positive evidence of pretext beyond proximity |
| Hostile work environment claim | Durant asserted persistent isolation, admonishments, denial of resources created hostile environment | District argued conduct was not severe or pervasive and often related to performance issues | Affirmed: no severe or pervasive discriminatory conduct shown |
| Request to reopen discovery / supplement record | Durant asked for remand to add allegedly omitted depositions and documents | District opposed; trial court record showed multiple extensions and ample discovery opportunities | Denied: Durant had ample opportunity and did not explain how additional materials would create a triable issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Grimes v. Dist. of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83 (D.C. Cir.) (movant can discharge summary judgment burden by showing absence of evidence)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (moving party may point out absence of evidence rather than produce contrary proof)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (plaintiff must present affirmative evidence to defeat a properly supported summary judgment motion)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (standard for materially adverse retaliatory actions)
- Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (burden-shifting and pretext analysis)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (prima facie burden-shifting framework for discrimination/retaliation)
- Holowecki v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 552 U.S. 389 (2008) (what constitutes an EEOC charge for exhaustion purposes)
- Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir.) (reprimand or procedural demands not necessarily materially adverse)
- Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (hostile work environment severe-or-pervasive standard)