Dupray v. Jai Dining
432 P.3d 937
Ariz. Ct. App.2018Background
- On Aug. 5, 2013, Pedro Panameno drank heavily (pre‑club bourbon and alcoholic drinks, then 11–12 beers at JAI’s gentlemen’s club) and became visibly intoxicated; his BAC at the collision was 0.210–0.274.
- After leaving the club around 8:00 p.m., Panameno rode with a friend to the friend’s house, then drove the friend’s brother to the girlfriend’s house; the girlfriend said he appeared intoxicated and tried to take his keys, but Panameno drove off and rear‑ended Mark Dupray on a scooter, severely injuring him.
- Dupray and his wife sued Panameno (negligence; negligence per se) and JAI (common‑law dram shop negligence; negligence per se for overserving an obviously intoxicated person).
- At trial the jury found JAI 40% at fault, Panameno 60% at fault, awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages against both, and JAI moved for JMOL arguing no breach and that Panameno’s post‑departure driving were intervening/superseding causes.
- The trial court denied JMOL and refused JAI’s proposed jury instruction defining intervening and superseding cause; this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Dupray) | Defendant's Argument (JAI) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Breach of duty by server (dram‑shop/common law) | JAI overserved Panameno to obvious intoxication and violated duties/statute; staff failed to monitor or intervene. | JAI complied with its duty as a matter of law; Panameno left the club safely so JAI did not breach. | Jury had sufficient evidence of breach; trial court correctly denied JMOL. |
| Proximate cause / intervening & superseding cause | JAI’s overserving proximately caused Dupray’s injuries (actual and legal cause). | Panameno’s independent decisions to drive after leaving others’ homes were unforeseeable superseding causes that broke causation. | Existence of intervening/superseding cause was factual and for jury; JMOL improperly granted would have been premature — denial of JMOL was correct. |
| Jury instruction on intervening & superseding cause | Not applicable (plaintiff); argued general causation instruction sufficed. | Requested a specific instruction defining intervening and superseding cause and requiring an unbroken causal chain. | Trial court abused discretion by refusing the proposed instruction; the instruction accurately stated law and was critical to the jury’s determination. |
Key Cases Cited
- Crackel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 208 Ariz. 252 (App.) (standard for reviewing denial of JMOL)
- McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs. Inc., 228 Ariz. 262 (App.) (jury credibility and conflict of evidence limits on JMOL)
- Patterson v. Thunder Pass, Inc., 214 Ariz. 435 (App.) (duty of tavern and intervening/superseding cause analysis where patron was transported home)
- Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500 (Sup. Ct.) (actual vs. proximate cause; superseding intervening cause doctrine)
- Quiroz v. ALCOA Inc., 243 Ariz. 560 (Sup. Ct.) (causal‑connection requirement in negligence)
- Barrett v. Harris, 207 Ariz. 374 (App.) (actual cause and proximate cause principles)
- McMurtry v. Weatherford Hotel, Inc., 231 Ariz. 244 (App.) (proximate cause is typically a jury question)
- Robertson v. Sixpence Inns of Amer., Inc., 163 Ariz. 539 (Sup. Ct.) (intervening/superseding cause is fact question for jury)
- DeMontiney v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr. Inc., 144 Ariz. 6 (Sup. Ct.) (requirements for giving requested jury instructions)
- Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288 (App.) (general causation instruction may suffice in some contexts)