Dunn v. Reeves, 594 U.S. 731

Background

In 1996 Matthew Reeves shot and killed Willie Johnson; Reeves was convicted and the jury recommended death.
Trial counsel sought and obtained funding for neuropsychologist Dr. John Goff but did not have Goff evaluate or testify at the penalty phase; counsel instead called Dr. Kathleen Ronan, who had only partially tested Reeves.
At state postconviction (Rule 32) Reeves called Dr. Goff, who opined Reeves met criteria for intellectual disability; the State’s expert disagreed.
Reeves did not call his trial attorneys to testify at the state evidentiary hearing; the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief, explaining the record was silent as to counsel’s reasons and noting petitioners ordinarily must question trial counsel to overcome the presumption of reasonable performance.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, reading the Alabama opinion as applying a categorical rule requiring counsel testimony and granting habeas relief on deficient-performance grounds.
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, holding the Alabama court’s decision was a case-specific, reasonable application of Strickland and that federal habeas courts must defer under §2254(d). Justice Sotomayor (joined by Justice Kagan) dissented, arguing the state court had applied an unlawful per se rule.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Reeves)	Defendant's Argument (Dunn/State)	Held
Did the Alabama Court apply a per se rule that an IAC petitioner loses if he does not call trial counsel at the evidentiary hearing?	Alabama applied a categorical rule that counsel must testify; absence of counsel testimony cannot be dispositive.	The Alabama opinion was fact-specific; it denied relief because the record was silent as to counsel’s reasons.	Majority: Alabama did not apply a blanket rule; its denial was case-specific and reasonable. Eleventh Circuit erred. (Reversed and remanded.)
Did counsel render constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to hire a neuropsychologist to develop intellectual-disability mitigation (Strickland performance/prong)?	Counsel were deficient for not using available funding to secure Dr. Goff, and that omission prejudiced Reeves.	Counsel made a strategic choice entitled to a strong presumption of reasonableness; the record provided possible justifications.	Majority: On this record the state court’s conclusion that counsel acted reasonably was permissible; federal court must defer—no unreasonable application of Strickland shown.
Did the Eleventh Circuit properly grant habeas relief under AEDPA by finding the state court’s decision unreasonable?	The Eleventh Circuit: yes—state court unreasonably applied Strickland by treating lack of counsel testimony as dispositive.	The Eleventh Circuit mischaracterized the state opinion and failed to give required deference under §2254(d).	Majority: Eleventh Circuit misread the state court and failed to defer; reversal required.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes the two-prong ineffective-assistance standard)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (strong presumption of reasonable professional assistance; doubly deferential review on habeas)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (courts must consider the range of possible reasons for counsel’s actions)
Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12 (2013) (absence of evidence cannot overcome presumption of counsel’s reasonableness)
Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19 (2002) (federal courts must not mischaracterize state-court opinions)
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (prohibits execution of intellectually disabled defendants)
Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30 (2009) (per curiam) (counsel’s mitigation investigation may be inadequate in some cases)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (counsel’s failure to investigate mitigation can be unreasonable)
Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263 (2014) (per curiam) (reasonableness of counsel’s expert-related choices assessed objectively)
Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (Strickland’s circumstance-specific reasonableness inquiry)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (Strickland requires case-by-case examination of evidence)