Dunn-McCampbell Royalty Interest, Inc. v. National Park Service
630 F.3d 431
| 5th Cir. | 2011Background
- Padre Island Seashore was created under the Enabling Act (1962) with surface lands transferred to the United States and a concurrence requirement from Texas.
- Texas Consent Statute (1963) preserved mineral rights and ingress/egress for exploring minerals beneath conveyed lands; surface was conveyed to the Service with reservations.
- Service adopted the 2001 Oil and Gas Management Plan designating Sensitive Resource Areas that restrict surface oil/gas activities; Dunn-McCampbell asserted the Plan violated their ingress/egress rights.
- Dunn-McCampbell sought APA declaratory relief arguing the Plan exceeded the Service’s authority and violated the Enabling Act and Consent Statute; the district court granted summary judgment for Dunn-McCampbell.
- Fifth Circuit reversed in part, holding Dunn-McCampbell not protected by the Consent Statute and that minerals beneath the Seashore can be within park boundaries; remanded for judgment in favor of the Service.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Plan transgresses the Enabling Act and APA by denying ingress/egress rights. | Dunn-McCampbell protected by Consent Statute and Enabling Act. | Service may regulate easements and close areas to protect the Seashore. | No; Plan does not violate the plain text of the Consent Statute or Enabling Act. |
| Whether Dunn-McCampbell has ingress/egress rights under Section 3/6 of the Consent Statute. | Rights extend to Dunn-McCampbell as grantor/successor in title. | Dunn-McCampbell is not a grantor or successor in title, so not protected. | Dunn-McCampbell not protected by Sec. 3/6. |
| Whether the mineral estate under the Seashore lies within park boundaries for purposes of Section 459d-3(b). | Mineral estate outside Seashore boundaries; rights protected by 459d-3(b). | Mineral estate beneath surface is within the Seashore boundaries; rights do not extend. | Minerals beneath the Seashore are within park boundaries; 459d-3(b) does not grant ingress/egress relief. |
| Whether the Sense of Congress provision in Energy Policy Act 2005 supports Dunn-McCampbell’s interpretation. | Congress intended to preserve private mineral rights under Enabling Act. | Sense of Congress is not controlling for this interpretation. | Unpersuasive; Sense of Congress does not override unambiguous Enabling Act text. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (broad federal authority over public lands, not limited by state law)
- United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940) (federal authority over federal lands; limits on agency power)
- Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995) (plain-language interpretation; avoidance of absurd results)
- Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 799 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir. 1986) (interpretation of land management statutes; checkerboard ownership context)
- United States v. Stephenson, 29 F.3d 162 (4th Cir. 1994) (park boundaries focus on statutory boundaries, not title ownership)
- Free Enterprise Canoe Renters Ass'n of Mo. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983) (boundaries and applicability of park laws to non-federal land within parks)
- Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008) (Texas minerals ownership and exploitation rights; subsurface estate concepts)
