Dufort v. City of New York
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 21322
2d Cir.2017Background
- October 7–8, 2006: a brawl at Pastel Karaoke left one victim dead and another severely injured; surveillance shows Dufort at the bar holding a one-and-a-half-foot pipe and later leaving with others, but no video captures the assault itself.
- Dufort (15 at the time) wore a maroon sweatshirt; several other patrons wore similarly colored shirts; police recovered surveillance stills and interviewed witnesses.
- Witness Hwa Young Park told police she saw an assailant from behind wearing a red/maroon shirt but admitted she did not recognize faces; she later identified Dufort in a lineup in which he was the only person wearing similar-colored clothing.
- Police arrested Dufort three days later and charged him; Park’s lineup identification was the primary direct identification presented to a grand jury; prosecutors did not disclose that Park’s ID was based on clothing color.
- Dufort spent nearly five years jailed awaiting trial, was tried in 2011, and was acquitted; he then sued the City and several detectives under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and due-process violations.
- District court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of due-process claims but vacated and remanded the false arrest and malicious prosecution claims because material factual disputes (and qualified-immunity issues) remained.
Issues
| Issue | Dufort's Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| False arrest: was there probable cause to arrest Dufort? | No — arrest rested principally on a suggestive lineup ID based only on sweatshirt color and thin circumstantial evidence. | Yes — surveillance, witness statements, and presence at scene provided probable cause. | Reversed: disputed material facts (especially reliability of Park's ID and police omissions) preclude summary judgment; jury must decide. |
| Malicious prosecution: was there probable cause to initiate/prosecute charges? | No — charging relied on the same weak ID and later equivocal cooperator testimony; prosecution lacked probable cause. | Yes — additional testimony (cooperator and other witness) and grand jury indictment supply probable cause. | Reversed in part: material disputes about probable cause and weight of post-arrest evidence require trial. |
| Causation / intervening acts: did the DA’s decision and grand jury break chain of causation? | No — prosecutors/grand jury were allegedly misled; police withheld the limited nature of Park’s ID so their actions did not constitute independent intervening causes. | Yes — independent prosecutorial decisions and grand jury indictment break chain of causation. | Reversed: disputed factual issues about what prosecutors/grand jury knew preclude summary judgment; indictment’s presumption of probable cause may be rebutted if police misconduct misled them. |
| Due process / fabricated or withheld evidence at trial (fair-trial / Brady claim) | Police/prosecutors suppressed or distorted evidence about the suggestive lineup, violating due process. | No material Brady violation — the limited nature of Park’s ID (clothing-only) was elicited at trial, so the record was not distorted. | Affirmed: no § 1983 due-process claim because the allegedly withheld/misrepresented evidence was disclosed at trial and thus did not distort the criminal proceeding. |
Key Cases Cited
- Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845 (2d Cir. 1996) (elements of false arrest claim under § 1983 and state law)
- Walczyk v. Rio, 496 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2007) (probable cause as mixed question; when undisputed facts permit legal determination)
- Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (probable cause must be particularized to the person seized)
- Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (probable cause focuses on probabilities and the totality of circumstances)
- Raheem v. Kelly, 257 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (risk of misidentification from lineups where suspect alone matches a key descriptive detail)
- Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2003) (probable cause is a complete defense to malicious prosecution under New York law)
- Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986) (qualified immunity protects all but the plainly incompetent; applicability in arrest contexts)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process)
- Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000) (fabrication of evidence claim under § 1983 requires that fabrication cause a deprivation of liberty)