Duffy v. CBS Corp.
182 A.3d 166
Md.2018Background
- James F. Piper worked as a steamfitter at Pepco’s Morgantown Generating Station; undisputed last exposure to asbestos-containing insulation occurred between May 3 and June 28, 1970.
- Piper was diagnosed with mesothelioma on December 26, 2013 and sued multiple defendants (including Westinghouse/CBS) in March 2014 for negligence, strict liability, breach of warranty, and related claims.
- The statute of repose at issue was enacted in 1970 as Chapter 666 (originally Art. 57, §20) and later codified as CJP § 5-108; it bars certain causes of action more than 20 years after an improvement is first available for use, with specified exceptions.
- The dispositive legal question was whether an asbestos-related injury "arises" at the time of exposure (pre-enactment) or at diagnosis/discovery (post-enactment), i.e., whether the 1970 statute of repose barred Piper’s claims.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for Westinghouse; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed treating diagnosis as the injury date; this Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the statute of repose bars Piper’s claims | Piper: injury "arose" at last exposure (June 1970); statute enacted afterward, so it cannot bar his claims | Westinghouse: injury accrued at 2013 diagnosis; statute of repose (as codified) bars causes accruing after an improvement’s 20-year repose period | Held: "exposure approach" applies — injury arises at last exposure; statute of repose does not bar claims that arose before enactment |
| Meaning of "arise" v. "accrue" in the 1970 statute | "Arise" means originate (exposure date); accrual (discovery rule) is a different concept | Westinghouse: treat "arise" same as "accrue" to effectuate purpose paragraph limiting discovery rule after 20 years | Held: "arise" (injury origin) and "accrue" (when plaintiff knows/should know) are distinct; Legislature used both deliberately |
| Applicability of Scribner (exposure approach) to statute of repose | Piper: Scribner’s exposure approach governs asbestos cases and shows injury arises at exposure | Westinghouse: Scribner was limited to noneconomic-damages cap and not broadly controlling here | Held: Scribner’s exposure approach applies equally to determine whether injuries arose before statute’s effective date |
| Retroactivity / vested rights / effective date issue | Piper: uncodified Sec. 2 of Ch. 666 excludes causes "arising on or before June 30, 1970" from the statute | Westinghouse: statute operates to limit discovery-rule-driven accruals after enactment; applying it here does not infringe any vested right | Held: presumption against retroactivity applies; statute did not and should not bar causes that had already arisen before July 1, 1970 |
Key Cases Cited
- John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369 (2002) (adopts "exposure approach": asbestos-related causes of action arise at last exposure)
- Harig v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 284 Md. 70 (1978) (applies discovery rule to latent-disease product-liability claims; accrual upon discovery or what reasonable diligence would reveal)
- Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Benjamin, 394 Md. 59 (2006) (applies discovery rule to wrongful-death/survival claims from asbestos; accrual when causal link is discovered)
- Rose v. Fox Pool Corp., 335 Md. 351 (1994) (discusses legislative history and purpose of CJP § 5-108; statute of repose protects defendants from latent-defect exposure)
- Burns v. Bechtel Corp., 212 Md. App. 237 (2013) (intermediate appellate decision applying § 5-108 in an asbestos/construction context; distinguished on facts)
- Mattingly v. Hopkins, 254 Md. 88 (1969) (explains difference between when a wrong happens, knowledge of it, and accrual; accrual can be complex for latent injuries)